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THE PROCOMPETITIVE INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
THOMAS F. COTTER*

ABSTRACT

When government recognizes intellectual property (IP) rights, it
is often viewed as sanctioning the existence of private
"monopolies," in contrast to the general antimonopoly thrust of the
antitrust laws. And yet, on occasion IP law itself condemns
conduct on the part of IP owners-or excuses otherwise infringing
activity on the part of IP defendants-expressly for the purpose
of promoting competition. It does so even though antitrustlaw -if
one were to apply it at all under analogous circumstances-would
not find anticompetitive harm without conducting a more
thorough analysis of whether the antitrust defendant possesses
power over a well-defined market. Salient examples include the
misuse doctrines in patent and copyright law; some applications
of merger and fair use in copyright; and trademark law's
functionality doctrine. In this Article, Professor Cotter develops a
theoretical explanation for that divergence between antitrust and
IP. Specifically, he argues that in some limited contexts the
expected social costs, including error costs, of ruling for IP
defendants may be low in comparison with the expected
anticompetitive harm from ruling for IP plaintiffs. As a result, IP
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank, for their comments
and criticism, Ariel Katz, Mark Lemley, Glen Robinson, Phil Weiser, and David Zaring;
participants at faculty workshops held at the University of Minnesota and at Washington
and Lee University School of Law; and attendees at the Fifth Annual Intellectual Property
Scholars Conference at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and the 2006 Annual Meeting
of the American Law and Economics Association at the University of California at Berkeley.
Special thanks to Nicholas Frazier and Adina Pollan for research assistance; to Washington
and Lee University, for a research grant; and to Professor Tom Vinson of Washington and
Lee's Mathematics Department for assistance with the mathematical analysis. Any errors
that remain are mine.
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courts sometimes may enhance welfare if they are less concerned
than antitrust courts about the expected costs of "false positives,"
that is, cases wrongly decided against the party defending the
allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Put another way, it sometimes
may be appropriate for courts to excuse IP defendants from
liability, in order to avert relatively speculative threats of anticompetitive harm. Professor Cotter further contends that such
cases probably are more common in the copyright than in the
patent law context, and that even in copyright contexts courts
should be cautious about casually inferring anticompetitive harm;
but that his analysis provides a rationalefor a relatively expansive
definition of trademarkfunctionality.
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INTRODUCTION

Conventional wisdom holds that antitrust and intellectual property (IP) law seek to maximize social welfare in opposite ways, with
antitrust law condemning monopolies to attain this goal and IP
law granting temporary monopolies to achieve the same end.' This
"wisdom" is an oversimplification insofar as (1) contemporary
antitrust enforcers, recognizing that IP rights typically do not give
rise to economically meaningful monopolies,2 approach IP-related
conduct and transactions with much less inherent suspicion than
often was the case in years past;3 and (2) antitrust law by itself does
not condemn the mere possession of monopoly power, but rather
certain exercises of or efforts to obtain it. 4 Nevertheless, there is a
kernel of truth to the conventional characterization, to the extent
that IP rights sometimes enable the exercise of a degree of market

1. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-AntitrustParadox,150 U. PA. L.
REv. 761, 762-63 (2002) (arguing that the "right to exclude" encourages "invention and
innovation"); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection:A Reappraisal,97 HARv. L.
REV. 1813, 1817, 1818 n.10 (1984) (discussing the monopolistic purpose of patent law).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.1 (1995) [hereinafter IP GUIDELINES]; see also 1
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 4.2, at 4-9 to -10 (2002 & Supp. 2006) (noting that
IP rights do not guarantee financial success); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374 (2003) (arguing that "monopoly"
does not have the same connotation in IP law as it has in antitrust); cf. Ariel Katz, Intellectual
Property,Antitrust, and the Presumptionof Market Power: Making Sense of Alleged Nonsense
(Univ. of Toronto Faculty of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 02-05, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=702462 (arguing that commercially successful IP rights often do
give rise to market power).
3. See IP GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 2.2 (stating that "[t]he Agencies will not presume
that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner,"
and that "there will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes" for an IPprotected "product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power"). In the view of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), "[i]ntellectual
property is ... neither particularly free from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, nor particularly
suspect under them." Id. § 2.1. This approach contrasts with the widespread suspicion
concerning the anticompetitive nature of IP rights throughout much of the twentieth century.
See, e.g., Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From
SeparateSpheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 178-84 (1997) (discussing the "nine
No-Nos" of IP licensing practices).
4. See infra text accompanying note 20.
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power,5 and sometimes even permit IP owners to engage in conduct
that would be unlawful absent the IP right.6 Though subject to
exaggeration, the recognition and enforcement of IP rights might be
seen as an exception to the antimonopoly policy embodied in the
antitrust laws.
There is another side of the coin, however, that is less frequently
commented on.7 On occasion, IP law condemns conduct on the part
of IP owners--or excuses otherwise infringing activity on the part
of IP defendants-for the express purpose of promoting competition.
It does so even though antitrust law-if it were to apply at alltypically would not condemn similar conduct on the part of the IP
owner, or require the IP defendant be given free access, absent
thorough analysis of (1) the markets within which the parties
compete, and (2) whether the IP owner possesses market power.8 To
5. 'Iarket power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below,
competitive levels for a significant period of time." IP GUIDELINES, supranote 2, § 2.2; see also
FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.3 n.30 (2000) [hereinafter COLLABORATION GUIDELINES] (using the
same language as other guidelines); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.1 (1992) (rev. Apr. 8, 1997) [hereinafter MERGER
GUIDELINES] (using the same language as the IP Guidelines). The agencies define a market
as
a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is produced or
sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm ... that was the only present
and future producer or seller of those products in that area likely would impose
at least a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price ....
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra, § 1.0.
6. For example, the Patent Act permits patent owners to engage in horizontal territorial
divisions with their licensees. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). This practice otherwise would
constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46,
48-50 (1990) (per curiam) (finding an agreement by which one of the parties withdrew from
a geographic market violated the Sherman Act); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (stating that
"[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief.., shall be ...
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having ... refused to license ...
any rights to the
patent"). But see 35 U.S.C. § 211 ("Nothing in this chapter ...
shall be deemed to convey to any
person immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to create any defenses to actions, under
any antitrust law.").
7. There has been some previous commentary touching on the issue above. See, e.g.,
Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2174-81
(2004) (discussing disparity between antitrust and trademark approaches to product market
definition); Anna F. Kingsbury, Market Definition in Intellectual Property Law: Should
IntellectualPropertyCourts Use anAntitrustApproach to Market Definition?,8 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REv. 63, 63-64 (2004) (similar). Bone's approach is closest to mine, but it is limited
to the trademark context.
8. Antitrust law itself does not always require proof of harm to a defined market. See
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illustrate, consider these examples of what are referred to here as
IP's "procompetitive doctrines":9
" In patent and copyright cases, courts sometimes apply the
misuse doctrine to render IP rights unenforceable until the
plaintiff "purges" that misuse.1" Courts continue to state the
principle that certain practices on the part of IP owners are
sufficiently anticompetitive to constitute misuse, even though
the same conduct would result in antitrust liability, if at all,
only upon proof of additional elements including market
power.1"
" In copyright law, courts sometimes excuse defendants from
liability by applying the mergeror fair use doctrines in contexts
in which the copyright owner's exercise of exclusive rights,
often in some aspect of its computer software, might impede
competition in a related market. 2 Courts, however, do not
require the defendant to define what that market is, or to
quantify the harm, in any way comparable to the plaintiff's
burden in analogous antitrust litigation.
" In trademark law, the functionality doctrine permits defendants to copy a trademark owner's distinctive product design,
notwithstanding the potential for consumer confusion, if inter
infra text accompanying notes 31-32. But antitrust law would be unlikely to condemn the type
of conduct I discuss in this paper in the absence of such proof.
9. In certain instances, some other IP doctrines-most notably, copyright's scenes a faire
and functionality doctrines, the latter of which differs from trademark's functionality doctrine
in some important ways--also can be thought of as embodying a balance between incentives,
on the one hand, and competitive need, on the other. See Michael J. Meurer, Vertical
Restraintsand IntellectualPropertyLaw: Beyond Antitrust,87 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1876, 1910
n.232 (2003) (discussing vertical and horizontal restraints on IP and the doctrines that govern
them). For space limitations, however, I confine my discussion above to four principal
doctrines with respect to which courts explicitly consider competitive need.
10. See, e.g., Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(explaining the application of the misuse doctrine); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d
970, 973-77 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining misuse as a defense in an infringement action).
11. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999)
(finding a copyright license to constitute misuse without establishing market power); SenzaGel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (pointing out the lower standard for
IP misuse).
12. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1993)
(applying fair use doctrine); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) (applying merger doctrine). Fair use also applies in several other settings for
reasons not directly related to competitive need. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
My focus here is on the competitive need line of fair use cases only.
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alia the copying is justified by competitive need.13 As in the
above two examples, however, courts rarely articulate what
they mean by "competitive need," 14 and do not apply antitrust
standards to determine whether according exclusive rights
would impede competition in any well-defined market.
Two possible justifications for IP law's comparatively loose
conceptualization of "markets" and "competition" are what might be
referred to as the "beyond the scope" and "adjudication cost"
rationales. The "beyond the scope" rationale posits that courts
correctly excuse IP defendants from liability when not doing so
would enable the IP owner to control subject matter that the IP laws
themselves, presumably for reasons bearing some relation to
competitive need, relegate to the public domain-"beyond the scope"
of the IP owner's rights. I will argue that this justification is useful
up to a point, but that ultimately it depends upon a preexisting
baseline-a principle that IP rights extend only up to Point X and
no further-which is only sometimes readily discernible. 5 Everyone
may agree, for example, that copyright does not subsist in ideas; but
exactly what distinguishes an "idea" from "expression" is often
unclear, and in many instances the distinction must be made in
light of its predictable consequences. Put another way, formalistic
application of IP's procompetitive doctrines to prevent the expansion
of IP rights beyond their scope might undermine consideration of
how best to interpret that scope to attain an optimal accommodation
of monopoly incentives with competition. Alternatively, under an
"adjudication cost" rationale, one might justify IP law's less rigorous
approach to competitive need on the ground that it would be unduly
13. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001)
(finding that product feature trade dress is functional, and hence not subject to trademark
protection, if, inter alia, the exclusive use of the feature "would put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
14. Id. (quoting Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507
(10th Cir. 1995)).
15. For similar observations, see Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1848-49 (noting the difficulty
of determining the "appropriate scope of a patent"); Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property
Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1469 (2004); Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse
Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and FirstAmendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1289, 1295 (1991).
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expensive in some contexts to prove competitive harm in the same
way that antitrust often requires. Potentially turning every merger
doctrine or trade dress case into a miniature antitrust dispute might
seem extravagant." Like the "beyond the scope" argument, however,
this argument also rests on a baseline assumption-in this instance,
that the social benefits of protecting the IP rights at issue are not
sufficiently large as to warrant investment of substantial resources
into more accurately evaluating competitive need. The assumption
may be correct, but it would be useful to articulate why, when the
costs of greater certainty are prohibitive, some cases involving
speculative competitive harms should be resolved in favor of IP
defendants rather than IP plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the preceding reservations, my thesis is that IP
law, on occasion, may increase social welfare by promoting competition in ways that antitrust law does not address, and may do so
based on evidence that would be insufficient in an antitrust context.
Context, in other words, is crucial; although forced sharing to attain
optimal competition might seem unwarranted in most antitrust
contexts, absent clear proof of market harm, it might constitute good
IP policy---even in the presence of ambiguous evidence. A major
premise of this argument is that both antitrust and IP law can be
viewed as seeking to minimize the expected cost of three things:
"false positives," that is, cases incorrectly17 decided in favor of the IP
defendant or the antitrust plaintiff; "false negatives," that is, cases
16. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and
Contract: Copyright Preemptionof Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 550-51 (1995)
(discussing the difficulties of applying antitrust principles to software copyrights). Presumably
many litigants would abandon these issues if courts did require such extensive proof.
17. "Incorrectly" means that a decision to the contrary would have produced more social
benefits than social costs. A case decided incorrectly in favor of an antitrust plaintiff or IP
defendant (a "false positive") is one in which social welfare would have been better served by
ruling in favor of the antitrust defendant or IP plaintiff. A case decided incorrectly in favor
of an antitrust defendant or IP plaintiff (a "false negative") is one in which social welfare
would have been better served by ruling in favor of the antitrust plaintiff or IP defendant. For
discussion within the antitrust literature, see, for example, C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven
C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 42 (1999) (highlighting
information analysis as the key to efficiency in the antitrust context); John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, Monopolization,Innovation,and Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
367, 387 (2001) (discussing false negatives and false positives and the ensuing cost). In IP
literature, see, for example, Bone, supra note 7, at 2125-81 (discussing enforcement costs in
trademark cases); Katz, supra note 2, at 48-54 (searching for "the optimal design of IP
rights").
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incorrectly decided in favor of the IP plaintiff or antitrust defendant;
and adjudication. In seeking to attain this goal, however, antitrust
and IP may diverge insofar as certain types of "false positive"
harms that are likely in the antitrust context may, on occasion, be
nonexistent in the IP context; and certain types of "false negative"
harms that are not cognizable in the antitrust context are worth
taking into account in the IP context. Apropos of the latter point, I
will argue that IP law sometimes should be less tolerant than
antitrust of (1) harms stemming from the exercise of small-scale
market power; (2) harms that are individually of little competitive
significance, but which in the aggregate threaten to reduce social
welfare; and (3) threats to dynamic efficiency stemming from the
reduction of competition in so-called "innovation markets." In
addition, although it often may be good antitrust policy to incur
substantial adjudication costs to define the market and ascertain
anticompetitive consequences, in the IP context it may enhance
welfare to avoid these costs if the stakes are sufficiently low, or if
one can be reasonably confident absent such analysis that the
expected costs, including error costs, of ruling for the plaintiff
outweigh the expected costs of ruling for the defendant.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief overview of the role of
market definition in antitrust law, and of the restrictions that
antitrust law places on the exercise of IP rights. Part II shows how
courts sometimes apply IP doctrine to promote competition in ways
that diverge from antitrust standards, and focuses on the examples
referred to above from each of the three main branches of IP law:
misuse, fair use and merger, and functionality. Part III fleshes out
the analysis of false positives and false negatives, and argues that
certain harms should be of more interest in the IP than the
antitrust context. Part V applies this analysis to the misuse, fair
use, merger, and functionality doctrines. I conclude that, notwithstanding the theoretical case for a more aggressive competition
policy in some IP contexts, courts should be wary of applying the
misuse doctrine in all but the most exceptional circumstances. A
less rigorous analysis of competitive harm may make sense,
however, in some contexts involving fair use, merger, andespecially-functionality.
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THE ANTITRUST CONTEXT

The dominant view today among antitrust courts and scholars is
that antitrust law is a tool for promoting social welfare by
deterring practices and transactions that tend to increase market
power.'" Economic theory predicts that the monopolist maximizes
profits by charging a higher price, and producing less output, than
would a competitive firm, and that the monopolist's gain from so
doing is less than consumers' loss, known as the "deadweight loss."' 9
As a first approximation, then, measures that deter monopoly
increase social wealth, but this principle is subject to a number of
qualifications. The first is that the "mere possession of monopoly
power," as opposed to its willful acquisition or maintenance, is not
an antitrust offense.2" Second, antitrust policymakers have come to
recognize that the prospect of attaining market power may
encourage innovation; indeed, this is the principal rationale for
granting IP rights to innovators.2' Partially in response to this
insight, antitrust law today is concerned not only with the static
inefficiency defined by deadweight loss, but also with improving
consumer welfare over the long run (so-called "dynamic" efficiency).2 2 Most importantly, perhaps, antitrust standards must
18. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of
Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 633-34, 637-38 (2005) (discussing the
adoption of economic authority in antitrust litigation); Steven L. Schwarcz, PrivateOrdering,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319, 332 (2002) (discussing the history of antitrust policies).
19. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 67 (1988).
20. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
21. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FORTHE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3,19-21 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the monetary rewards that motivate artists
and inventors). One influential view of innovation, first advanced by the economist Joseph
Schumpeter in the 1940s and still debated among innovation theorists, is that the gains from
innovation outweigh the relatively transitory losses from monopoly. See JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRAY 84-85, 100-03 (Harper Torchbooks
1976) (1942). On this logic, measures to encourage innovation should dominate over the
comparatively trivial concerns of antitrust; the gains from innovation are permanent, whereas
no monopolist can maintain its position forever. Note also that trademark law, unlike patent
law and copyright law, is designed principally to lower consumer search costs, by according
exclusive rights to source identifiers; but in so doing, it provides an incentive for producers
to invest in quality control. See infra note 138.

22. See, e.g., Ronald W. Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current
Practicein Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 682-83 (2003) (discussing the forward-looking
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accommodate the reality that decision making is susceptible to
error, and that efforts to reduce the incidence of error can be costly.
Antitrust policy therefore should take into account both the risk of
error, 23 and judicial and other administrative costs. 2 4 Applying
different standards of antitrust scrutiny to different conduct can be
seen as an effort to minimize the sum of these costs.
To illustrate, courts have interpreted section 1 of the Sherman
Act, which condemns contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade, 2 to render per se illegal practices including
horizontal price-fixing, output restrictions, and geographic divisions,
as well as vertical minimum retail price maintenance.26 The stated
rationale behind per se condemnation is that such practices are
so likely to impede competition that a detailed inquiry into their
27
effects in particular cases would not justify the additional costs.
Other types of arrangements, however, which courts view as offering plausible procompetitive benefits, are analyzed using the rule
of reason, under which "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."28
nature of merger analysis).
23. This includes the risk of both false positives, that is, that courts will wrongfully
condemn as inefficient conduct that increases social welfare, and false negatives, that is, that
courts will wrongfully permit conduct that reduces welfare.
24. See Beckner & Salop, supra note 17, at 44-46 (discussing efficient decision making);
Lopatka & Page, supra note 17, at 387 (discussing the costs of false positives and false
negatives). The expected cost of an erroneous decision is a function of the frequency of error,
which can sometimes be reduced by investing more in adjudication costs, and the magnitude
of the harm flowing from the error. See Bone, supra note 7, at 2124 (describing the "expected
cost" of error).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-50 (1990) (per curiam)
(addressing geographic divisions); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99
(1984) (addressing output restrictions); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
344-55 (1982) (addressing horizontal price-fixing); Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d
11, 16 (1st Cir. 2004) (addressing vertical minimum resale price maintenance).
27. These costs include the additional administrative and judicial costs such an inquiry
would entail, and the greater uncertainty borne by potential litigants. See Ragsdale v.
Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2002) (commenting that it is "wastefur' to
engage in a detailed inquiry because there are "broad generalizations holding true in so many
cases").
28. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see, e.g., State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10-22 (1997) (holding that vertical maximum resale price maintenance
is subject to the rule of reason); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717, 726-36 (1988)
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In practice, courts apply something of a sliding scale to determine
how detailed an inquiry is necessary, given the likely effects of the
arrangement in question on competition.2 9 As a result, often the
most important issue is how to characterize a practice or transaction. Characterizing a transaction as horizontal price-fixing, for
example, invokes per se illegality, whereas a different characterization, if plausible, may result in no assessment of liability.3 °
In cases involving per se illegality, it is often unnecessary to
define the market because the practice at issue would make no
sense unless it had the effect of monopolizing some product or
geographic market." For example, naked price-fixing among
competitors typically makes no economic sense unless the competitors constitute a dominant share of some discrete market. 32 In most
other instances, however, courts will not presume anticompetitive
effects, but rather will require the antitrust plaintiff to prove them.
Even then, formal market definition may not always be necessary.
In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,33 for example, the
Supreme Court held that an agreement among defendants to
withhold dental x-rays from insurance companies, while not per se
illegal, could be condemned under a truncated version of the rule of
reason after finding the proffered procompetitive justifications for
(holding that vertical nonprice restraints are subject to the rule of reason); Nw. Wholesale
Stationers v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,295 (1985) (holding that horizontal
refusals to deal are subject to the rule of reason, absent proof that the defendants possess
market power); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29-30 (1984) (holding
that tying is subject to the rule of reason, absent proof that, inter alia, the seller possesses
market power).
29. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999); PolyGram Holding, Inc.,
FTC Docket No. 9298, at 13-35 (July 24, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/
polygramopinion.pdf.
30. An example is BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc., 441 U.S.
1 (1979), in which the Court declined to characterize BMI's royalty scheme as price-fixing,
noting its likely efficiency in minimizing transaction costs. See id. at 8-9, 22.
31. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERALANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 5.6b, at 252-54 (2d ed. 1999).
32. In a competitive market, price fixing below cost reduces the price fixers' profits below
the break-even point, while price-fixing above cost will induce consumers to buy from the
price-fixers' noncolluding rivals. Logic therefore suggests that firms engaging in price-fixing
must control a substantial portion of a market, and that forgoing proof of market power
therefore conserves judicial and party resources. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430-31 (1990).
33. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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the agreement wanting. 34 However, absent proof of "actual detrimental effects," such as higher prices or lower output or quality,
once an agreement evades per se condemnation the plaintiff must
support its claim with evidence of the effect of the targeted restraint
on competition in some well-defined market.35
The process of defining markets can be laborious. As a general
matter, the courts and agencies define a market as
a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it
is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing
firm ...
that was the only present and future producer or seller
of those products in that area likely would impose at least a
"small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price ....
36
In a competitive market a firm that imposes a 'small but significant
and nontransitory' increase in price" would lose money, as its
customers would switch to other suppliers of that product, or to
other substitute products. Thus, in analyzing whether Product A
occupies a discrete market, one must consider not only whether
there are other sellers of Product A, but also whether Product A is
interchangeable with other existing or potential products.3 Due to
the difficulty of estimating cross-elasticities of demand and supply,
however, enforcers often consider proxies for demand- and supplyside substitutability."
34. See id. at 459-61. The Court did not require formal proof of the relevant market,
reasoning that,
[s]ince the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is
to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse
effects on competition, "proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction
of output," can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but
a "surrogate for detrimental effects."
Id. at 460-61 (quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429 (1986)).
35. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(comparing evidentiary requirements under per se illegality and the rule of reason);
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § 3.3, at 11 (describing the rule of reason).
Plaintiffs asserting other types of antitrust claims also must properly define the market. See,
e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 (1992)
(analyzing a claim under the Sherman Act § 2); MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § 1.0
(discussing market power in the context of mergers).
36. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § 1.0, at 4.
37. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481-82 (defining the relevant market narrowly
because Kodak equipment is unique).
38. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § 1.11, at 6-7.
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The government's Antitrust Horizontal Merger Guidelines state
that the agency should continue the process of defining the market
in the following manner:
If, in response to the [hypothetical] price increase, the reduction
in sales of the product would be large enough that a hypothetical
monopolist would not find it profitable to impose such an
increase in price, then the Agency will add to the product group
the product that is the next-best substitute for the merging
firm's product.
The price increase question is then asked for a hypothetical
monopolist controlling the expanded product group.... Th[e]
process will continue until a group of products is identified such
that a hypothetical monopolist over that group of products would
profitably impose at least a "small but significant and
nontransitory" increase .... The Agency generally will consider
the relevant product market to be the smallest group of products
that satisfies this test.39
As a general matter, a "price increase of five percent lasting for
the foreseeable future" constitutes a '"small but significant and
nontransitory"' increase, although "the Agency at times may use a
price increase that is larger or smaller than five percent. 4 °
Although the preceding analysis was developed specifically for use
in evaluating mergers, courts apply similar criteria for defining the
market in section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act cases.
Although this is not the place for an exhaustive treatment of the
subject, the exercise of IP rights can add further complexities to
antitrust analysis. If the IP laws are to fulfill their purpose of
stimulating creativity and other social benefits by offering the lure
of potential monopoly profits, antitrust policy must accommodate
the IP owner's exercise of market power up to some point. Even so,
it is clear that some transactions involving IP can be subject to per
se condemnation. Tying arrangements, for example, remain per se
unlawful, though subject to many qualifications, and they are not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny merely because the antitrust
defendant conditions the sale or license of its IP, as opposed to some
39. Id.
40. Id.
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other good, on the purchase or license of another product. 41 Most IPrelated transactions, however, are evaluated under the rule of
reason. IP licenses, for example, can embody a wide variety of
restraints, including a commitment on the part of the licensee to
confine its use to a specific territory; or to limit its use to certain
purposes, known as a "field of use" restriction; or to grant back to
the IP owner a license to use any IP that the licensee itself derives
from the use of the owner's IP. 42 Alternatively, IP owners may agree
43
to license one another's patents and create a "patent pool,"
ostensibly to facilitate the parties' use of the patents and to reduce
transaction costs. Agreements such as these, particularly if they are
nonexclusive, are also likely to pass muster absent proof that the
restraints (1) have specific anticompetitive effects and (2) are not
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive efficiencies, such as
the reduction of transaction costs and the efficient development and
use of new technologies.4 4
As for monopolization claims, the law is clear that enforcing IP
rights acquired by fraud, or asserting "sham" infringement claims,
can violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. 45 Beyond these examples,
however, there is some uncertainty concerning just how far
antitrust should intrude into the domain of IP. Section 2 claims
directed against a unilateral refusal to license one's IP,for example,
present great difficulties because the ability to decide if and when
to license is often viewed as an essential aspect of IP rights. A few
courts, therefore, have held or implied that a refusal to license IP
can never constitute a section 2 violation, other than in cases
involving fraud in the procurement or sham petitioning.46 Others
have held that a refusal to license IP is presumptively valid, but
41. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292 (2006) (holding that
"tying arrangements involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards"
that apply in nonpatent cases).
42. See IP GUIDELINES, supranote 2, § 2.3, at 5, §§ 5.5, 5.6.
43. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase,and Intellectual Property,94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2662 n.27 (1994) (discussing the purpose of patent pools).
44. See IP GUIDELINES, supra note 2, §§ 4.2, 5.5, 5.6.
45. See Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1993) (outlining a two-part definition of "sham" litigation); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965) (addressing a claim of fraud in
obtaining a patent).
46. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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that the antitrust plaintiff can rebut the presumption by showing
that the refusal was a pretext.4 7 A considerable amount of scholarly
literature debates these competing views.4 8
The resolution of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article; suffice to say that, under even the approaches that are more
friendly to antitrust plaintiffs, antitrust law normally defers to the
IP owner's refusal to deal with prospective licensees. Therein lies an
apparent paradox. Antitrust law rarely condemns unilateral
refusals to share property, even more rarely condemns unilateral
refusals to share intellectual property, and in any event requires
proof of market definition and market power before undertaking
to impose forced sharing. And yet IP law itself, for the avowed
purpose of promotingcompetition, is sometimes much less generous
to IP owners, granting IP users access without requiring comparable
proof of market definition and market power. This paradox is not
insoluble, but it does require fresh analysis of, among other things,
the costs of error in IP litigation.

II. IP's PROCOMPETITIVE DOCTRINES
A. Misuse
The misuse doctrine in patent and copyright law evolved from a
series of early twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions, all of
which involved questions of whether patent owners could enforce
their patents against persons who disregarded notices, affixed
to patented products, stating that use of the product was subject
47. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63-65 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Image
Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 1997); Data Gen.
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 & n.64 (1st Cir. 1994).
48. See, e.g., 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
709b (2d ed. 2002) ("[The courts have

almost uniformly held that a refusal to license cannot be an antitrust violation."); Joseph P.
Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights:Reflections
on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions,55 DEPAUL L. REv. 1211, 1212 (2006) (discussing
"under what circumstances should the antitrust laws impose a duty to deal on the owner of
intellectual property); Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Why an Original Can Be
Better than a Copy: Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Refusal To Deal, and ISO Antitrust
Litigation, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 143, 145 (2001) (arguing that "a unilateral refusal to deal"
is warranted in the patent context); Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing To Deal with Rivals, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1210 (2002) (arguing that the "right not to deal" encourages inventors).
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to restrictions.4 s It was not until 1942, however, that the Court
specifically crafted a "misuse" doctrine in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co.5" The evidence in that case showed that Morton leased
its patented machines on the condition that lessees use the
machines only in conjunction with nonpatented salt tablets made by
the plaintiff's subsidiary." Morton filed a patent infringement suit
against another company that allegedly made and sold infringing
machines.5 2 The Court held Morton's patent unenforceable, despite
evidence that (1) the defendant itself was not a party to the
restrictive licenses, and was not charged with inducing others to
breach the restrictive licenses; (2) the licenses may not have violated
the Clayton Act because they did not substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the market for salt tablets; and
(3) the defendant's machines may well have come within the scope
of the patent's claims.5 3 Citing the equitable principle that courts
"may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using
the right asserted contrary to the public interest," the Court
announced that the use of a patent "to suppress competition in the
sale of an unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aid
of a court of equity to restrain an alleged infringement by one who
is a competitor." 4 Significantly, the Court refused to limit the
principle to cases in which the patentee's misconduct relates to the
particular transaction at issue, or in which the defendant competes
with the plaintiff in the market for the unpatented product.5 5
Subsequent cases extended Morton Salt in various respects, holding
for example that misuse could consist of setting royalty rates on the
basis of the licensee's sale of unpatented products" or licensing a
patent on condition that the licensee continue to pay royalties after
49. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519
(1917) (disregarding notice attached to film projectors).
50. 314 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1942).
51. See id. at 489-91.
52. See id. at 490-91.
53. See id. at 490-94.
54. Id. at 491, 492.
55. Id. at 492-94. The doctrine of unclean hands, however, is much narrower. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 32 cmt. d (Tentative Draft

No. 3, 2004) (stating that, under the doctrine of unclean hands, "a party guilty of inequitable
conduct in the underlying transactionmay on that account be denied a claim based on unjust
enrichment") (emphasis added).
56. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139 (1969).
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the expiration of the patent. 7 Amendments to the Patent Act,
however, including the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988,5 have
made it more difficult for courts to equate tying arrangements with
misuse. The Act added two new subparts to section 271(d), which
together require the defendant to prove that the patentee has
market power, rather than relying on a presumption that the patent
confers such power.5 9
Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (the court that, since 1982, has heard most appeals in patent
cases) have added some clarity to the law of misuse while also
leaving some abiding questions. The Federal Circuit describes
misuse as an effort to "impermissibly broaden[ ] the 'physical or
temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect,"6 °
and it employs a three-step inquiry to determine whether a patentee
is guilty of misuse. The first step is to characterize the practice
at issue as per se misuse, per se lawful, or falling within some
intermediate category.6 ' Practices constituting per se misuse include
tying-subject, however, to section 271(d)(5), which requires proof
of market power and thus renders tying a per se offense in name
only-and "arrangements in which a patentee effectively extends
the term of its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties. 6 2 Per

57. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30-34 (1964); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293
F.3d 1014, 1017-21 (7th Cir. 2002); cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259,
265-66 (1979) (holding that federal patent law did not preempt a contract to pay a five percent
royalty if a patent issued on the inventor's application, and a lower royalty indefinitely if the
patent did not issue). More controversially, the Court in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 663-70 (1944), held that patent misuse could arise from tying
a patent license to the sale of a nonstaple product-that is, a product that has no substantial
use other than in connection with the patented invention. A subsequent amendment to the
Patent Act, however, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 1980, overruled Mercoid and put
to rest the notion that patentees cannot enforce their rights against persons who knowingly
supply nonstaple articles for others to use for infringing purposes. See Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Corp., 448 U.S. 176, 199-223 (1980).
58. See Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674,4676 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)(5) (2000)).
59. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
rev'd on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
60. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).
61. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
62. Id.
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se lawful practices include those listed in section 271(d)(1)-(4).63 If
the practice is neither per se misuse nor per se lawful, then
a court must determine if that practice is "reasonably within the
patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject matter within the
scope of the patent claims." If so, the practice does not have the
effect of broadening the scope of the patent claims and thus
cannot constitute patent misuse. If, on the other hand, the
practice has the effect of extending the patentee's statutory
rights and does so with an anti-competitive effect, that practice
must then be analyzed in accordance with the "rule of reason."
Under the rule of reason, "the finder of fact must decide whether
the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including
specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's
history, nature, and effect."'
Using this approach, the Federal Circuit has held that common
restraints, such as field-of-use restrictions and package licensing,
should be evaluated under the rule of reason.6 5
Perhaps the most controversial of the Federal Circuit's misuse
decisions is Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc." In Mallinckrodt,
the patentee sold its patented medical devices to hospitals on the
condition that the latter would dispose of these devices after a single
use.6 7 Some hospitals ignored this restriction, however, sending
their used devices to Medipart for reconditioning and then using
them again." The patentee filed suit against Medipart for infringement and for inducing infringement on the part of the hospitals.6 9
Characterizing the condition as a field-of-use restriction, rather
than as a per se offense such as tying or price-fixing, the court
63. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)-(4) (2000).
64. Va. Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (internal citations omitted).
65. See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Intl Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (finding a tying arrangement permissible); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d
1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the rule of reason when the "restriction exceeds the
scope of the patent grant").
66. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
67. See id. at 701-02.
68. See id. at 702.
69. See id.
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reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the restraint
was "reasonably within the patent grant, i.e., that it relate[d] to
subject matter within the scope of the patent claims." If the answer
to that question was no, the court was to determine whether the
anticompetitive effects of the restraint violated the rule of reason.7 °
The court also concluded that, if the restriction on reuse proved to
be lawful under the preceding analysis, then the first-sale doctrine
7
also would provide no defense to the claim of unauthorized use.
The extent to which the misuse doctrine departs from antitrust
principles remains unclear around the edges. Both the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit have continued to state that misuse
and antitrust are not coextensive,7 2 and at least in the context of per
se misuse this appears to be correct. An agreement to continue
collecting royalties after the patent term, for example, would not
constitute an antitrust violation, absent proof of anticompetitive
effect. And even though section 271(d)(5) moves the law of tying
misuse closer to its antitrust counterpart, the overlap is not
complete; it may be that assertions of tying misuse can be sustained
on a lesser showing of anticompetitive harm than would be the case
with respect to an analogous antitrust claim.7 3 In addition, any
patent defendant can raise the defense of misuse, even if he has
suffered no harm from the conduct constituting misuse, whereas
private antitrust claims can be asserted only by a party who himself
70. See id. at 703-09.
71. See id. at 709. On this reasoning, the first-sale doctrine, which generally permits the
lawful owner of a product incorporating a patented invention to use and resell the product
without permission from the patent owner, would appear to be a default rule that the parties
can modify at will. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 33-36 (2001) (criticizing this result).
72. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) (stating
that, when there is patent misuse, "it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies
the ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act"); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3
Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that misuse is "a broader wrong than
antitrust violation because of the economic power that may be derived from the patentee's
right to exclude," and that it "may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not
met"); Mallinckrodt,976 F.2d at 704 (stating that the purpose of patent misuse doctrine is "to
restrain practices that d[o] not in themselves violate any law").
73. See, e.g., Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 670 & n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding that an antitrust tying claim involves two separate goods, as defined by consumer
demand, being tied, whereas the law of misuse "need not look to consumer demand (which
may be non-existent) but need look only to the nature of the claimed invention as the basis
for determining whether a product is a necessary concomitant of the invention or an entirely
separate product").
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has suffered, or is threatened with, "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were meant to prevent." 4 Finally, although the Federal
Circuit's adoption of a rule of reason taken from antitrust case
law suggests that in non-per se cases the antitrust and misuse
standards are identical, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme
Court would agree, should it ever take up the issue.
That misuse may extend beyond the scope of antitrust is more
apparent in the copyright context. Although the Supreme Court has
never clearly endorsed a copyright misuse doctrine, beginning in the
1990s several federal courts of appeals have done so. The trend
began with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lasercomb America
Inc. v. Reynolds.7" In Lasercomb, the plaintiff owned a copyright
in a computer-assisted die-making software program known as
Interact.76 The defendant copied the program, and then created and
marketed its own, nearly identical, competing program.77 The
district court entered judgment for the plaintiff on its copyright
infringement claim, but the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground
of copyright misuse.7 8 Citing the Supreme Court's patent misuse
decisions as a basis for recognizing an analogous copyright misuse
defense,7" the court took issue with provisions in Lasercomb's
standard licensing agreement requiring that licensees not develop
or market their own computer-assisted die-making software during
the ninety-nine year term of the agreement.8 0 Although the
defendant itself had never executed the standard agreement,"
the court concluded that the license was "anticompetitive," an
"attempt[] to suppress any attempt by the licensee to independently
implement the idea which Interact expresses" and "to use its
copyright ... to control competition in an area outside the copyright,

74. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). There also is
no necessary connection between the amount of harm suffered by the victims of the misuse
and the penalty imposed upon the patentee, namely the loss of the right to enforce the patent.
See Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationalityof the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78
CAL. L. REv. 1599, 1616-17 (1990).
75. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
76. See id. at 971.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 979.
79. Id. at 973.
80. See id. at 978-79.
81. Id. at 973.
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i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture."8 2 The court
furthermore rejected recourse to antitrust's rule of reason, stating
that "[tjhe question is not whether the copyright is being used in a
manner violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing
agreement is 'reasonable'), but whether the copyright is being used
in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of
a copyright."' Other courts have followed Lasercomb in applying
the copyright misuse doctrine to excuse copyright defendants from
liability, based on evidence that would not suffice to prove anticompetitive harm in an antitrust context.84
As the above discussion demonstrates, there are two overarching
policies that form the contours of the misuse doctrine. One is
competition policy; but the case law is largely silent as to why
competition policy demands that antitrust be supplemented in this
fashion, or why society should condemn, on competition grounds,
conduct that falls short of constituting an antitrust violation. The
other is what I referred to in the Introduction as the "beyond-thescope" rationale: the concern that IP owners should not be allowed
to "extend the scope" of their monopoly. This concern is clearly
related to competition policy, insofar as the scope of IP rights can be
understood as reflecting some balance of monopoly incentives and
competition. Defenders of the misuse doctrine, however, might
argue that that balance is sometimes different from the balance
82. Id. at 973, 977, 978-79.
83. Id. at 977-78.
84. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 783-84, 794-95 (5th Cir.
1999) (holding that an agreement requiring licensees of the plaintiffs software to use the
software only in conjunction with hardware manufactured by the plaintiff constituted misuse,
but that the evidence that the plaintiff had power over a properly defined market was
insufficient to support the defendant's counterclaim for violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 517-20 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the AMA committed misuse by requiring a federal agency to use AMA materials
only on condition that the agency would not use other nomenclature systems, despite the lack
of evidence that the AMA's conduct posed a "realistic threat to public access" or violated the
antitrust laws). See also Assessment Technologies, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 64347 (7th Cir. 2003), in which Judge Posner suggested in dictum that a copyright plaintiffs
attempt to chill users from accessing public-domain materials might constitute misuse on a
theory analogous to abuse of process. This position contrasts with Judge Posner's more
skeptical thoughts on misuse. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir.
1982) (stating that "[olur law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it
is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of
patent holders to debilitating uncertainty").
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struck by antitrust. IP policy dictates that facts and ideas, for
example, must remain in the public domain, regardless of whether
the exclusive control over some facts or ideas would permit the
exercise of market power in a given case.
The preceding analysis is useful, but only up to a point. An initial
difficulty is that the beyond-the-scope rationale offers no reason why
efforts to expand one's IP rights beyond the scope of the grant is
such an egregious offense that, contrary to conventional standing
requirements, it may be pleaded by someone who is unaffected by
the offending transaction.8 5 In addition, the beyond-the-scope
rationale often appears to rest on the premise that the scope of the
grant is clear, but this is often not the case. Although a patent's
claims are described as the "metes and bounds" of the invention,86
IP rights do not come with metes and bounds in any literal sense;
determining whether an invention falls within the literal scope of
those claims is often a difficult task. 7 Determining the scope of a
copyright is no less difficult, because there is nothing analogous to
claims defining the limits of the work of authorship. To be sure, that
outer limit must stop short of mere ideas and facts. As the following
subsection shows, however, it is not always easy to determine what
an idea or fact is; what falls within the category of idea or fact is
itself often not a fact, but rather a conclusion based on policy.
Consider too such questions as whether the scope of the grant
prevents the IP owner from requiring licensees to pay post-expiration royalties or to purchase other goods and services. To conclude
that permitting such conduct would enable IP owners to expand
the scope of their "monopoly" assumes that the monopoly does not
encompass the right to engage in such conduct in the first place.
Whether that conclusion is correct should be decided on the basis of
consequences, not formalistic distinctions.'
85. See Lemley, supranote 74, at 1614-20; cf. Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1123 (2003) (arguing that misuse doctrine helps to preserve the integrity
of the IP system, but not articulating why this policy requires parties who would not have
standing to assert the unclean hands defense to have standing to assert misuse).
86. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Rader, J., dissenting).
87. See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (noting the difficulty of determining whether there has been infringement).
88. Cases such as Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1964), for example, which
condemned post-expiration royalties, are often criticized for elevating form over substance.
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B. Merger and Fair Use
The merger doctrine arises from the distinction that copyright law
makes between ideas, which are not copyrightable, and expression,
which is. An early case often cited as having recognized this
distinction, Baker v. Selden, involved a dispute between the authors
of two books explaining bookkeeping systems.8 9 The Selden book
explained one of the systems and included forms consisting of ruled
lines and headings to illustrate that system. Baker's book explained
a similar system and used somewhat similar, though hardly
identical, forms.90 In ruling for the defendant, the Supreme Court
reasoned, first, that a bookkeeping system as such-as opposed to
the words that Selden used to explain his system--did not fall
within the subject matter of copyright.9 ' Second, the Court asserted
that Selden's forms fell outside the scope of copyright, to the extent
those or similar forms "must necessarily be used as incident to" the
system.9 2
Although the meaning of Baker has been debated for decades, the
most persuasive reading of the case is that one is privileged to copy
expression that is a "necessary incidento" to the use of an uncopyrightable idea 9 -or, to put it another way, that a copyright owner
cannot leverage her copyright over expression into control over
uncopyrightable subject matter, or mere ideas.9 4 This interpretaNonparties to the contract in Brulotte remained free to practice the patent at issue following
its expiration. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 380. Moreover, the principal
consequence of invalidating post-expiration royalty contracts is simply to preclude the parties
from agreeing to an efficient financing method similar to an installment contract. See id. at
380-81, 417-18 (describing Brulotte as "one of the all-time economically dumb Supreme Court
decisions"); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, LimitingPatentees'MarketPower Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The PerverseBenefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REV. 985, 1026-27 (1999) (recommending that Brulotte be overruled).
89. 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879). Baker v. Selden itself never used the term "expression,"
however. See Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 177 & n.l11 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
90. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 100-01.
91. See id. at 101-04. This outcome is preserved in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act,
which states that copyright does not subsist in, among other things, systems. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2000).
92. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104.
93. See Samuelson, supra note 89, at 176-77, 180-81.
94. See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2003);
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[B][3], at 13-79

(2005).
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tion, in turn, elides into the merger doctrine, the first articulation
of which arose in Morrissey v. Procter& Gamble Co. 95 The plaintiff
in Morrissey owned the copyright to a set of rules for a sweepstakes
game involving contestants' Social Security numbers; the defendant
copied the rules for use in its own contest. 6 In finding for the
defendant, the First Circuit reasoned that
[w]hen the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so
that "the topic necessarily requires," if not only one form of
expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting
would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere
handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of
the substance.9"
Other courts have applied the merger doctrine to permit the
unauthorized copying of items, including a piece of jewelry
depicting a bee,9" a map based on a public domain source,9 9 a
municipal building code, 10 0 and elements of computer programs
that are dictated by functional considerations or other external
constraints.' ° ' In a variety of other cases, however-some involving
similar subjects, and others involving items such as data compilations, 10 2 estimates of current or future prices,"0 3 and religious
scriptures' 4 -courts have held that the relevant ideas did not merge
95. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
96. See id. at 676, 678.
97. Id. at 678 (internal citations omitted).
98. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
99. See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (5th
Cir. 1990). But see Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138-41 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that merger did not apply to the maps in that case).
100. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Intl, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800-02 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
101. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-42
(6th Cir. 2004).
102. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 977, 979 (7th
Cir. 1997) (finding a taxonomy copyrightable); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 70507 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that a merger did not occur because "there are a sufficient number
of ways of expressing the idea").
103. See, e.g., CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the merger
doctrine inapplicable to a "wholesale price guide"); CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt.
Reports, 44 F,3d 61, 68-73 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that CCC could copyright its compilation
of used car prices).
104. See Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94,99 (2d
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with the plaintiffs expression. Although some applications of the
merger doctrine seem fairly intuitive, many are hardly obvious. For
one thing, the premise that only a 'limited number" of ways exist
to express a given idea rests upon the assumptions that there is
some discernible meaning to the term 'limited number," and that
courts can determine whether small differences are sufficiently
distinct to constitute separate ways of expressing an idea. But there
is little guidance on these issues from the case law, and critics
complain that courts sometimes leap to the conclusion that merger
applies, on the basis of insubstantial evidence. 5
A second, more fundamental, problem is that no clear formula
exists for deciding, as a first step before assessing the number of
ways to express an idea, precisely what the relevant idea is. If the
idea is defined broadly enough-say, the idea for a game of chance,
as opposed to the idea for a sweepstakes game involving Social
Security numbers-there will always be a multiplicity of ways of
expressing that idea. Deciding how broadly or how narrowly to
define the idea determines the outcome, but courts rarely disclose
what factors lead them to seize upon one definition of "idea" over
another.' °6 A few courts and commentators, however, have recognized that the task of defining the idea must derive from policy
considerations, including whether the interest in accessing the
plaintiffs work is so great that competitive need outweighs copyright's incentive scheme.'0 ° But the process of idea definition
Cir. 2002); Penguin Books U.S.A. Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1680, 1696 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1569, 1573 (E.D. Va. 1996).
105. Several scholars, for example, have taken issue with Morrissey'sconclusion that there
are only a handful of ways to draft sweepstakes instructions. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 94, § 2.18[C][2], at 2-204.5; Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy 25 (George
Mason U. L. & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract_id=374580.
106. The Second Circuit has stated that it will construe the "idea" more broadly when it
reflects "taste and personal opinion," Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707, and more narrowly when it
comprises the "building blocks of understanding," CCC Info., 44 F.3d at 71. In theory, this
standard correctly leaves the "building blocks" less vulnerable to capture by private parties,
but it still leaves a good deal of play in the joints. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 94, §
13.03[B][3], at 13-83 to 13-84.
107. A few decisions at least refer to competitive need as a factor in their analysis. See CCC
Info., 44 F.3d at 72 n.25 (citing Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742); Kern River Gas Transmission
Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing the same passage in
Kalpakian); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
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remains primitive in comparison with the process of market
definition in antitrust law, even though both arise from a common
interest in promoting competition. As with the misuse doctrine,
courts rarely explain why a specific outcome is necessary to achieve
a desirable competitive balance.'
Similar, in many respects, are a subset of cases decided under the
fair use doctrine. As a general matter the fair use doctrine, as
embodied in section 107 of the Copyright Act, entitles one to engage
in otherwise infringing activity subject to certain qualifications.
Section 107 begins with a list of uses that, all other things being
equal, are more likely than others to be deemed fair, including uses
for purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...
scholarship, or research."0 9 But not all uses that fall within these
categories are necessarily fair, while some uses that fall without
are. 110 The statute goes on to enumerate four factors that are
relevant to the fair use determination, including the nature and
purpose of the use; the nature of the work; "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted

1983) (citing the same passage in Kalpakian);Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,
446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The guiding consideration in drawing the line is the
preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and
copyright laws."). Scholarly commentary has also observed competitive need as a factor in the
analysis. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 94, § 13.03[f(1], at 13-133 (stating that
the line between ideas and expression "is a pragmatic one, drawn not on the basis of some
metaphysical property of 'ideas,' but by balancing the need to protect the labors of authors
with the desire to assure free access to ideas"); Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyrightand
Other Protectionof Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
338, 346 (1992) ("In copyright law, an 'idea' is not an epistemological concept, but a legal
conclusion prompted by notions-often unarticulated and unproven-of appropriate
competition.'); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
119, 158-59 (1991) (proposing that courts apply merger when doing so would not risk
deterring authors from creating); see also Shubha Ghosh, Legal Code and the Need for a
Broader FunctionalityDoctrine in Copyright, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'y U.S.A. 71, 101-10(2003)
(proposing a functionality doctrine in copyright law).
108. See Ghosh, supranote 107, at 102 (making a similar point).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
110. CompareSony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984) (holding
that private copying of television programs in order to watch them at more convenient times
constituted fair use per se), with Princeton Univ. Press. v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d 1381,
1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that copying for purposes of making college course
packets was not fair use).
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work as a whole"; and "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyright plaintiffs work.""'
Some applications of fair use have relatively little to do with
competition policy as such. One class of fair uses, for example,
involves cases in which the copyright owner probably would have
granted the defendant permission to copy, but the cost of negotiating for permission would have exceeded the value of that use and
therefore would have precluded voluntary bargaining."' In such a
case, excusing the defendant from liability makes users better off,
and owners no worse off, than they otherwise would have been.
Another class involves uses that are perceived to confer social
benefits substantial enough to warrant departure from the private
bargaining model. The use of quotations from a work in order to
critique it or to report upon it, for example, presumably gives rise to
social benefits from the resulting commentary; at the same time,
exempting the user from liability prevents copyright owners from
using their copyrights to deflect criticism." 3 A subset of this latter
class comprises cases in which courts invoke competitive need as
a reason for permitting copying. Two of the leading cases, Sega
EnterprisesLtd. v. Accolade, Inc."4 and Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.," 5 involve the reverse engineering of
computer software.
In Sega, the plaintiff, Sega Enterprises, marketed the Genesis
video game console and an array of complementary video game

111. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
112. See LANDES & POSNER, supranote 2, at 115-16; Thomas F. Cotter, Accommodating the
Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Works for Religious Purposes Under the Fair Use Doctrine
and Copyright Act § 110(3), 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43, 44-45 (2004).
113. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 117-23; Cotter, supra note 112, at 45-47.
114. 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993).
115. 203 F.3d 596,598 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
975 F.2d 832, 842-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that copying for the purpose of reverse
engineering lawfully-obtained code, so as to extract the uncopyrightable elements from it, is
fair use). Similar to these reverse engineering cases is Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
International,Inc., in which the First Circuit concluded that Borland's copying of Lotus's user
interface, for the purpose of facilitating consumers' use of Borland's own spreadsheet program,
did not infringe because the interface was an "uncopyrightable 'method of operation."' 49 F.3d
807, 815-19 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); see also id.
at 821-22 (Boudin, J., concurring) (arguing that, in the alternative, Borland's copying may
have been a fair use because Borland copied for the purpose of marketing its independently
created product).
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cartridges.1 16 The defendant, Accolade, lawfully acquired copies of
some Sega games; copied the games' object code, which included
some copyrightable expression; and reverse engineered that code to
discover the uncopyrightable interface specifications that enabled
"compatibility with the Genesis console.""' 7 Using this information,
Accolade created its own Genesis-compatible games, which did not
incorporate Sega's copyrighted expression. 1 8 Sega nevertheless filed
suit, claiming that the intermediate copying, even though done for
purposes of creating the non-infringing, compatible games, itself
constituted copyright infringement." 9 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
holding that Accolade's intermediate copying was a fair use. 2 '
Of particular importance was the court's analysis of the fourth
fair use factor, the "effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work"' 2 1-here, the Sega video games
that Accolade copied. The court concluded that Accolade's conduct
did not threaten to "diminish potential sales, interfer[e] with
marketability, or usurp the market" by "supplanting" Sega games,
but instead "simply enable[d] the copier to enter the market for
works of the same type as the copied work."'2 2 Specifically:
Accolade did not attempt to "scoop" Sega's release of any
particular game or games, but sought only to become a legitimate competitor in the field of Genesis-compatible video games.
Within that market, it is the characteristics of the game program
as experienced by the user that determine the program's
commercial success....
By facilitating the entry of a new competitor, the first lawful
one that is not a Sega licensee, Accolade's disassembly of Sega's
software undoubtedly "affected" the market for Genesis-compatible games in an indirect fashion. We note, however, that ... video
game users typically purchase more than one game. There is no
basis for assuming that Accolade's "Ishido" has significantly
affected the market for Sega's "Altered Beast", since a consumer
might easily purchase both; nor does it seem unlikely that a
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See 977 F.2d at 1514.
Id. at 1514-16.
See id. at 1516.
See id.
See id. at 1527-28.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
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consumer particularly interested in sports might purchase both

Accolade's "Mike Ditka Power Football" and Sega's "Joe
Montana Football", particularly if the games are, as Accolade
contends, not substantially similar. In any event, an attempt to
monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to
compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting
creative expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable
basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine. 2 '
Notice how the court, in the preceding paragraphs, initially asserted
twice that the relevant "market" for fair use purposes was the
market for plural "Genesis-compatible video games," only to follow
up with a reference to the "market" for a single Sega game, "Altered
Beast."' 24 The court then asserted that consumers "might easily
purchase" both Sega and Accolade games, 2 ' though without any
analysis of consumers' budgetary constraints, or any citation to
evidence that consumers would not view the parties' games as
adequate substitutes for one another-which they clearly could be,
even if the games were not substantially similar for purposes of
infringement analysis. None of this necessarily means that the court
reached the wrong result, but its conclusory market definition and
its assertions about consumer demand are striking in comparison
with the more thoughtful analysis these issues typically would
receive in an antitrust suit.
In the second case, Sony, the defendant copied Sony's game
console to develop a platform, the Virtual Game Station, to compete
against Sony's PlayStation platform-rather than, as in Sega, to
develop applications that would be complementary to a platform.'2 6
Again, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the use was fair, stating in
relation to the fourth factor that "the Virtual Game Station is a
legitimate competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and
Sony understandably seeks
Sony-licensed games can be played ....
control over the market for devices that play games Sony produces
123. Id. at 1523-24 (emphases added).
124. Id. at 1523.
125. Id.
126. See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2000).
Specifically, the PlayStation console enabled users to play games on their television sets;
Connectix's Virtual Game Station enabled them to play Sony-compatible games on their
personal computers, though with some degradation of the visual aspects of the games. Id.
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or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not confer such a
monopoly."'27 As in Sega, the court did not provide support for its
definition of the relevant market-the "market for platforms on
which Sony and Sony-licensed games can be played"128 -or for its
implicit assertion that Sony possessed power over a well-defined
market. In fact, other video game platforms compete vigorously
against Sony's PlayStation.'2 9
Once again, the preceding criticism does not necessarily mean
that either case was wrongly decided. Both courts were careful to
note that the fair use privilege applies only if the defendant has a
"legitimate reason" for copying, and where copying is "necessary" to
understand how a product works. 3 ' Moreover, both results arguably
can be defended in light of the Baker v. Selden principle that a
copyright owner cannot leverage its copyright so as to create a
bottleneck over ideas. In fairness, in both of the Ninth Circuit
cases at issue, the court did cite this principle as well in connection
127. Id. at 607 (emphases added).
128. Id.
129. See Matt Richtel, A Game Console for the Rest of Us, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at C7
(discussing competition among Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo). To be sure, Sony's conduct
might seem to make little sense unless Sony has some ability to control (its own) price and
output-something it would be unable to do if competing products were perfect substitutes.
Similarly, the conduct of Sega in the preceding case might be viewed as a form of price
discrimination, and price discrimination requires some ability to control one's own price and
output. See infra note 271. More generally, Ariel Katz has argued elsewhere that, to a large
extent, the act of exclusion should define the market, see Katz, supra note 2, at 59-62
(discussing Walker Process claims), and some economists have argued (for example) that the
use of IP to effect price discrimination should give rise to a presumption of market power, see,
e.g., Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329, 2005 WL
2427646, at **22-24 (Sept. 28, 2005); Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329, 2005 WL 2427642,
at *18 (Sept. 28, 2005). But the use of intellectual property to effect price discrimination does
not necessarily imply the substantialmarket power that is typically the trigger for antitrust
liability, see LANDES & POSNER, supranote 2, at 374-75, and antitrust appears to be trending
away from the view that it does, see Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281,
1292 (2006) (stating that "while price discrimination may provide evidence of market power
...
it is generally recognized that it also occurs in fully competitive markets"). Even so, it might
be rational for IP law to concern itself with the (often) small degree of market power that is
incident to product differentiation, even if antitrust generally does not; to so conclude,
however, requires a reasoned justification, as discussed infra Part III.
130. Sony, 203 F.3d at 603-07; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526-28; see also Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that reverse engineering "must
not exceed what is necessary to understand the unprotected elements of the work").
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with its discussion of the fair use factors.'' Perhaps the principle
that copying for the purpose of gaining access to the uncopyrightable elements of a work is sufficient to achieve the result in
these cases, under the beyond-the-scope rationale, without consideration of market power.' 3 ' Stated in such an absolute way, however,
the principle is not without critics. Companies often invest much
more in the creation of their platforms than in the creation of the
applications for those platforms. 3 From an economic standpoint,
the defendant's marketing of competing applications in Sega may
have benefited the plaintiff, even if, contrary to the court's assumption, this marketing displaced some sales of Sega's own applications
by encouraging game enthusiasts to use the Sega platform." 4
Marketing a competing platform in Sony, by contrast, threatened
to undermine Sony's investment in the development of its
PlayStation."' Critics such as Philip Weiser therefore argue that
fair use should exempt intermediate copying in cases such as Sega,
but not in Sony."13 Moreover, the beyond-the-scope rationale still
leaves unresolved the issues of how to define the relevant idea or
fact in the first place; perhaps some interface specifications are
uncontroversially classifiable as "ideas," but other cases may not
lend themselves to such ready conclusions." 7 Finally, as with
misuse, there is a degree of question begging that the beyond-thescope rationale ignores. Why shouldn't the IP owner be permitted to
131. See Sony, 203 F.3d at 603-04; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526-28.
132. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527-28 ("[W]here disassembly is the only way to gain access to
the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where
there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use ...
as a matter
of law.").
133. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 562 (2003) (stating that Sony invested $600 million to develop the
PlayStation, while Connectix spent $150,000 to develop its emulator).
134. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1616-18, 1622 (2002).
135. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrineof Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 1177, 1224 (2000). Conceivably, though, it also might have increased sales of Sony's
applications, and the evidence showed that Sony was recouping its investment in the platform
from sales of applications and not from sales of the platform, which was selling below cost. See
Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 134, at 1622 n.220; Weiser, supra note 133, at 603 n.295.
136. See Weiser, supra note 133, at 602-03.
137. Even deciding what a "fact" is can create difficulties, as the cases involving estimates
of used car or coin prices show. See CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999);
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994).
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exercise its rights, even when this makes it difficult for others to
access ideas and facts? If the answer is to promote competition, how
do we know that competition requires this result, absent an analysis
of the relevant market?
C. Functionality
The functionality doctrine in trademark law presents yet another
example of a standard that appears to be rooted in a competition
policy more nebulous than anything found within the law of
antitrust. Under U.S. law, a trademark is any distinctive symbol
that identifies a unique product or service."' Although some of the
best-known trademarks are words (for example, COCA-COLA),
virtually any subject matter can serve as a source-identifier,
including "trade dress"-a term that can refer to product packaging,
product design, color, and perhaps other attributes as well. l3 9 For
trademark rights to subsist in such nontraditional fare, however,
the trade dress owner must be prepared to prove that the trade
dress is nonfunctional. 4 0 In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co.,
a 1995 decision in which the Supreme Court held that
distinctive, nonfunctional color can serve as a trademark, the Court
stated that a product feature is functional '"if it is essential to the
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article,' that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage."'42 As a result,
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
The principal right that flows from the ownership of a mark is to prevent another from
making commercial use of the same or a similar mark, such that the other's use would be
likely to confuse a substantial portion of prospective buyers into believing that the products
have a common source or sponsor. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 (1995). According exclusive rights over

source-identifying symbols tends to reduce consumers' costs of distinguishing among products
that appear similar but have different intrinsic qualities; as a corollary, trademark protection
provides an incentive for producers to maintain a consistent level of quality in their products,
so that the mark conveys a meaningful signal to consumers. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (1995).
139. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000). Note, therefore, that unlike misuse, fair use, and
merger, functionality is not a defense; nonfunctionalityis an element.
141. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
142. Id. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982)).
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even if consumers associate a functional product attribute as
emanating from a single firm, the attribute cannot be the subject of
exclusive trademark rights; at best, confusion will have to be
dispelled by some means, such as a disclaimer, short of enjoining
the defendant's concurrent use of the feature. 43
Commentators have identified as many as four distinct rationales
that the functionality doctrine could, in theory, serve. One would
interpret the functionality doctrine to deny trademark protection
to product features that could be the subject of utility or design
patent protection, on the theory that trademark protection for these
features contravenes a federal "right to copy" implicit in cases such
as Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.14 A second would
interpret the functionality doctrine so as to avoid a potential conflict
between statutory regimes, on the assumption that trademark
rights otherwise might enable inventors to exercise exclusive rights
in their inventions despite noncompliance with the more rigorous
conditions imposed by patent law. 145 A third posits that according
exclusive rights in product designs that have been disclosed in
utility patents prevents those features from falling into the public
domain, thus violating the terms of the "patent bargain" that
promises exclusive rights for only a limited time. 146 A fourth
interprets functionality as precluding the assertion of trademark
rights only when competitors must have access to a particular
design to compete effectively. 4 7
This last mentioned "competitive need rationale" 148 differs from
the three patent-related rationales insofar as it focuses solely on
whether, in the language of Qualitex, "exclusive use ...
would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage, 14 9
and not at all upon perceived conflicts with patent law or policy. As
143. See Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, Functional Design Features, and the
Trouble with TrafFix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 59-60 (2001).
144. 489 U.S. 141, 164-68 (1989). For articulations of this argument, see Margreth Barrett,
Consolidatingthe Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: EncounteringTrafFix on the
Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 79, 96-104 (2004); Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and
Fall of Trademark Law's FunctionalityDoctrine, 56 FLA. L. REv. 243, 343-44, 357 (2004).
145. See Barrett, supra note 144, at 146-51.
146. See id. at 153-57; Thurmon, supra note 144, at 343, 370.
147. See Barrett, supra note 144, at 151-53; Thurmon, supra note 144, at 282.
148. Thurman, supra note 144, at 282.
149. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (citation omitted).
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a result, application of the competitive need rationale alone can
result in classifying some trade dress as "functional," even though
the dress would appear nonfunctional from the standpoint of some
or all of the patent-based policies. This is illustrated by the so-called
"aesthetic functionality" doctrine, which applies to design features
that bear no relation to product performance, but which "confer[] a
significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use
of alternative designs."'' ° For example, in Wallace International
Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co.,' the Second Circuit
affirmed a judgment that the plaintiffs baroque-patterned silverware design was aesthetically functional, on the ground that
exclusive rights in the design would have enabled the plaintiff to
"exclude competitors from using those baroque design elements
15
necessary to compete in the market for baroque silverware.""
Because the design did not cause the silverware to perform any
better than other designs, however, exclusive rights would not have
created any conflict with the law of utility patents, and thus the
design would not have been functional if only the utility patentbased rationales governed. 5 ' By the same token, application of the
competitive need rationale alone would result in classifying some
trade dress as nonfunctional, because it is not necessary to effective
competition, even though it would be deemed functional from the
standpoint of one or more of the first rationales (for example,
because disclosed in the text of a utility patent).'
In its 2001 decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc.,'55 the Supreme Court recognized the competitive
need rationale as the touchstone for determining aesthetic functionality, while at the same time holding that product features
"essential to the use or purpose" of an article, or which "affect cost
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995). Non-aesthetic

functionality-the type at issue when a product feature is essential to the use or purpose of
an article, or affects its cost or quality-is sometimes referred to as "utilitarian functionality."
See id.
151. 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
152. Id. at 81. Nevertheless, the court did refuse to allow competitors to market an exact
duplicate of the plaintiff's design, in order to avoid confusion. See id. at 80.
153. Id. at 80.
154. See Thomas F. Cotter, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?: Resolving an Ostensible
Conflict Between PatentLaw and FederalTrademark Law, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 25,
39, 62-63 (1999); Thurmon, supra note 144, at 282-302.
155. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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or quality," are functional regardless of competitive need.156 In
support of this latter proposition, the Court noted that trade dress
protection can be procompetitive, to the extent it dispels confusion,
but that "protection must subsist with the recognition that in many
instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products," because such copying itself can promote competition and
technological advance; and that courts therefore should strive to
avoid "misuse or over extension of trade dress."'5 7 Apropos of this
latter point, the Court cited its decision from the preceding term in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,' in which the Court had
cautioned against the abuse of trade dress litigation as a means of
stifling legitimate competition.'5 9
Like the cases interpreting the merger doctrine, the cases
addressing functionality provide little guidance with respect to the
definition of key terms. As Robert Bone has noted, in determining
whether a given design is "essential to the use or purpose of the
article," judges are largely free to define the "article" however
broadly or narrowly they want. 6 ° If the article is defined broadly
enough-as "chairs" or "silverware," for example-there may be
relatively few features that literally are essential, and a correspondingly large number of alternatives available to competitors, to the
extent that competitive need remains a valid concern at least in
aesthetic functionality cases. A narrow definition, limited to the
specific product the plaintiff markets--"Eames chairs" or "baroquepatterned silverware," for example-will often lead to the opposite
result.' 6 ' As Bone notes, however, "courts seldom bother to define
the product before making the functionality determination. Instead,
they seem to rely on intuition and make rough judgments, mostly
implicit, about the appropriate level of generality at which to define
the product."'6 2 To be sure, courts sometimes rely on evidence,
156. Id. at 32-33.
157. Id. at 29.
158. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
159. See id. at 213.
160. Bone, supranote 7, at 2174-75.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 2176; see Kingsbury, supra note 7, at 69-70. There appear to be no cases in
which courts have applied antitrust standards to define the market affected by the exercise
of trade dress rights, or to predict the impact upon competition within that market if the trade
dress owner were accorded exclusive rights, though occasionally courts consider market
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often in the form of expert testimony, concerning the number of
comparable alternative designs open to competitors, as recommended by the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition.' 63 When
only a "limited number" of alternatives are available, the design is
likely to be functional." 4 As should be familiar by now, however,
deciding what constitutes a "limited number," or what makes one
design sufficiently distinct from another, or whether access to a
particular design is necessary to attain effective competition, rarely
if ever involves detailed analysis of the economic consequences
within any well-defined market.
As for the cases involving utilitarian functionality in particular,
the rule that product features are functional if they are essential to
the use or purpose of an article, or affect its cost or quality, without
regard to competitive need is consistent with the patent-based
rationales catalogued above. In conformity with the terminology
used throughout this Article, one might say that to permit trade
dress owners to assert exclusive rights in patentable product
features would enable them to expand the scope of their grants,
insofar as trademark law would enable the exercise of exclusive
rights indefinitely. As suggested throughout, however, beyond-thescope rationales such as this beg the question of what the appropriate scope is, and why. In cases such as TrafFix and Wal-Mart, the
Supreme Court seems to suggest that the appropriate scope of
trademark protection is narrow because otherwise the social
costs, including the potential for trademark rights to interfere
with competition and technological progress, outweigh the social
shares. See, e.g., Disc Golf Ass'n v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that design was functional, in light of evidence that seventy-seven percent of disc golf
courses used that design).
163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. b (1995); see also
Thurmon, supra note 144, at 282-302 (noting the prevalence of the "competitive need
rationale"). Although consideration of alternatives is more relevant to aesthetic than to
utilitarian functionality after TrafFix, the existence of alternatives might also shed some light
on whether a particular feature is in fact "essential" to the use or purpose of the article. See
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.75 (4th
ed. 2005) (arguing in favor of this approach).
164. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. b (1995) (stating that "a
design may be functional if it is one of a limited number of superior designs"); see also Disc
Golf, 158 F.3d at 1009 (commenting on the dearth of alternative designs for golf courses);
Chrysler Corp. v. Vanzant, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that a grille
screen design is functional when there are only two other alternatives).
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benefits.'6 5 I will argue below that this assumption may be correct,
but that it nevertheless is useful to develop a framework for
comparing the relative costs and benefits. Moreover, if the Supreme
Court is right, it also may be useful to consider whether product
design trade dress protection, for either utilitarian or aesthetic
features, is ever worth even a small risk of anticompetitive harm.
III. ANALYZING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ALLEGED
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT

As the case law presented above shows, on some occasions
antitrust and IP law diverge in their approach to the possibility that
anticompetitive harm may flow from certain practices relating to
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. To some extent, these
differences may be arbitrary, or the result of historical accident. To
the extent there are good reasons for this divergence, however,
those reasons may be related to the differing costs, including error
costs, of ruling for plaintiffs and defendants in some antitrust and
IP contexts. In this Part, I present a thought experiment based upon
a stylized model of a tribunal's decisionmaking process, both to
illustrate the preceding points and to suggest how the real world
decisionmaking process necessarily differs from the theoretical
ideal. I then consider the various types of harms that would be
relevant to this analysis, in both the antitrust and IP contexts.
A. A Thought Experiment
The model begins by positing that a tribunal is charged with
judging either an antitrust claim or an IP claim implicating one of
IP's procompetitive doctrines, in a manner that will maximize
expected social welfare. To carry out this charge, the tribunal must
predict and compare two different harms. The first harm, H 1 , is the
potential social loss that may result from a ruling in favor of the
antitrust defendant or the IP plaintiff. The second harm, H2 , is the
social loss that may result from a ruling in favor of the antitrust
plaintiff or the IP defendant. The presumption is that the tribunal
165. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2001); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000).
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will rule for the antitrust defendant or IP plaintiff if the expected
value of H2 (E(H)) exceeds the expected value of H, (E(H));
conversely it will rule in favor of the antitrust plaintiff or IP
defendant if E(H) is greater than E(H). To maximize expected
social welfare, however, the tribunal also must consider the cost of
adjudication, the extent to which it can be confident that its
estimates of H and H 2 are accurate, and the relation between cost
and greater accuracy.
The first step is to delineate the components of H 1 and H 2. One
major component of H, is the deadweight loss from monopoly,
although I will argue below that in the IP context there may be
other components to consider as well. As for H 2, in the antitrust
context this harm is composed of whatever cognizable efficiency
losses (for example, reduction of transaction costs) may result from
condemning the conduct at issue.16 6 In the context of the IP
doctrines, on the other hand, an additional component of H2 is the
harm to the incentive structure of the IP system. A ruling in favor
of the IP defendant, for example, on a fair use or misuse defense
reduces the expected payoff from producing creative subject
matter, and therefore may reduce the incentive of others to create
and publish. This harm is certainly difficult to quantify-and for all
we know, it may be relatively small across a wide range of
endeavors-but the IP system is based in large part on the assumption that it exists, and that IP rights are a corrective to the problem.
The tribunal therefore cannot ignore this harm, although as we
shall see it may be able to discern some specific instances in which
there is a high likelihood that the harm is small.
Second, the model assumes that the tribunal can either make
a preliminary determination, based on an initial submission of
evidence, to rule in favor of the plaintiff or defendant; or it can
defer its decision pending further evidence. Because the future is
uncertain, however, the best the tribunal can do at either stage is
to estimate probable future harm. In theory, one way to make this
estimate would be for the tribunal to take a random sample of
166. Other components of H2 in the antitrust context may include the private costs of
structuring transactions so as to avoid potential liability, and the social costs of encouraging
alternative transactions, which themselves may give rise to the possibility of anticompetitive

behavior, such as some forms of vertical integration. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 17, at
387.
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estimates of future harms that may flow from ruling one way or the
other. For example, the tribunal could survey a panel of independent experts to obtain different assessments of the values of H, and
H 2. It could then pool those assessments to produce individual
estimates of the means of H, and H 2. Alternatively, the tribunal
could assign different weights to its own estimates of these possible
future consequences.' 6 7 In theory, the tribunal could then use
statistical techniques to determine if the sample data show
conclusively that one mean is greater than another.
To illustrate, suppose first that the tribunal obtains five
independent estimates of H, specifically (7, 4, 4, 10, and 15),
denominated in some relevant monetary unit; and that it obtains
five observations of H2 , specifically (12, 20, 17, 30, and 21). On the
assumption that H, and H2 are normally distributed, a t-test
reveals an observed t-statistic of t = 3.33, leading to the statistically significant conclusion that E(H 2) is greater than E(H). 6 8
Abstracting from the cost of making the initial determination, the
result is clear: the tribunal should rule in favor of the antitrust
defendant or IP plaintiff. On the other hand, if one is not willing to
assume that H1 and H 2 are normally distributed, a nonparametric
Mann-Whitney test could be used instead; it too would reveal a
statistically
significant conclusion that E(H 2) is greater than
1 69
E(H,).

Alternatively, suppose that the estimates of H, and H2 are (10, 1,
12, 0, 17) and (30, 4, 36, 19, 11), respectively. Repeating the t-test,

167. This is not necessarily as strange as it may sound. Real-world tribunals may be able
to draw upon the different testimony of multiple expert witnesses (most of whom, however,
will be retained by the parties and therefore may be biased). Or the judge may be able to
assign different probability estimates to different possible future states of the world that may
result from permitting or forbidding a particular restraint.
168. See MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 224 (2d ed.
2001). Using the hypothetical observations from the above text, the t-score comes to -3.33,
which corresponds to a p-value of 0.01. See id. at 571 tbl. E. In many scientific studies, a pvalue of .05 or less is considered to be statistically significant.
169. To employ the Mann-Whitney test, one would rank the ten observations (five for H,
and five for H,) as follows: 4, 4, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 30. The sum of the ranks (S) of the five
H, observations (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 6 = 16) is statistically significant. See id. at 343-44, 580 tbl.
H2. The related U-statistic is 24, id., which corresponds to a z-value of 2.40 and a p-value of
0.02 (though it would be preferable to compute the z-value on the basis of a larger sample
size). See id. at 557 tbl. A2; SHARON L. WEINBERG & KENNETH P. GOLDBERG, STATISTICS FOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 495-96 (1990).
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the tribunal would find that t = 1.78, with a p-value of 0.11.170 A
similar result is found from a Mann-Whitney test, where the z-value
is 1.57 and the p-value is 0.12. l17 Using either test, the difference
between the H and H 2 data is statistically insignificant. Notice that
the means of the estimates, 8 and 20 respectively, are the same as
in the first example; the greater variances in the second example
preclude the inference of a distinction between the two harms. In
the latter case, then, the tribunal must choose from among three
imperfect options. The first, and theoretically the best, option
would be to continue sampling until it obtained a statistically
significant result. Continued sampling, however, most likely comes
at some cost, and thus the tribunal would have to make some rough
prediction whether the expected cost of additional sampling would
exceed the expected value of the sampling; this in turn would
depend on the stakes involved (that is, the magnitude of H and H2 ),
how much more sampling the tribunal expects would be necessary
to obtain a statistically valid result (and how would it know
that?),'72 and the expected cost of such additional sampling. A
second option would be to rule on the basis of whether E(H) is
greater or less than E(H), even though the difference between these
means is statistically insignificant, on the ground that this is simply
the best that can be done under the circumstances. A third option,
again assuming that further investigation is not feasible, would be
to rule in favor of the antitrust defendant whenever the result of the
initial determination is statistically insignificant. In doctrinal
terms, the tribunal would conclude in such a case that the antitrust
plaintiff has not met its burden of proof.'73 In the IP context, on the
170. See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 168, at 571 tbl. E.
171. See id. at 557 tbl. A2; WEINBERG & GOLDBERG, supra note 169, at 495-96.
172. Cf. JOHN KAY, CULTURE AND PROSPERITY: THE TRUTH ABOUT MARKETS-WHY SOME
NATIONS ARE RICH BUT MOST REMAIN POOR 219-20 (2004) ("How could the economist know

when to stop calculating when he cannot know the benefits of further calculation?"); Beckner
& Salop, supra note 17, at 45-47 ("The efficiency of gathering and using additional information
depends on the cost of the information versus the benefits.").
173. Note, however, that the relationship between statistical significance and the legal
burden of proof is not a simple one. In litigation in which scientific evidence is proffered,
courts are reluctant to admit evidence that fails to meet some definition of statistical
significance. Applying a restrictive causation standard, however, does not mean that the court
has increased the plaintiffs burden of proving causation above a "mere preponderance" (fifty
percent). See Michael D. Green, Science Is to Law as the Burden of ProofIs to Significance
Testing, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 205, 221-22 (1997) (reviewing CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC
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other hand, the default rule in an ambiguous case may depend on
whether the doctrine at issue is classified as an affirmative defense,
with respect to which the defendant bears the burden of proof, or
an element of the plaintiffs case-in-chief. As noted above, under
current law, misuse is an affirmative defense, as is fair use and
merger. 7 4 Nonfunctionality, on the other hand, is generally an
element of the trademark plaintiffs case,' 7 5 which suggests that in
an ambiguous case the court should rule for the trademark
defendant.
For obvious reasons, the preceding model differs from real world
practice in many particulars. Nevertheless, in its broad contours it
captures some important real world elements. The first is that,
although a court is unlikely to engage in multiple random sampling
of future events as such, it can and should engage in some analysis
of the various ways the future may play out if it rules for one side or
the other. The analysis may be rough, but it clearly is consistent
with antitrust jurisprudence, which counsels courts to consider the
pro- and anticompetitive effects of contested transactions and
practices, and with those IP doctrines that express concern for
competition. Second, it is unlikely that real-life tribunals can make
anything more than an educated guess about the actual magnitudes
of H1 and H, whether at the preliminary or a later state of the
proceedings, or about the costs and benefits of further investigation
concerning those harms. It may be possible, however, to engage in
considered analysis of what those harms are likely to consist of and
which harm is likely to dominate in a given case. For example, there
may be cases in which the court can conclude that the probability of
anticompetitive harm is relatively low but the expected harm, in the
sense of probability multiplied by magnitude if the event occurs, is
high; even this approximate comparison may be useful, as I discuss
below.
Finally, note that one can relate the preceding analysis to the
harms associated with false positives and false negatives. To see
why, consider the consequences of a court ruling incorrectly, that
SUBSTANcEs: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE LAw (1993)); David H. Kaye, Apples and
Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54, 65-66
(1987).
174. See supra note 140.
175. See id.
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is, of ruling for the antitrust defendant/IP plaintiff in a case in
which H, exceeds H 2, or in favor of the antitrust plaintiff/IP
defendant in a case in which H-2 exceeds H1 . The excess harm
flowing from an incorrect ruling in favor of the antitrust defendant/IP plaintiff can be thought of as the harm attributable to a
false negative, whereas the excess harm flowing from an incorrect
ruling in favor of the antitrust plaintiff/IP defendant can be thought
of as the harm attributable to a false positive. I will suggest below
that there may be some instances in which the expected cost of false
positives is predictably lower in the IP than in the antitrust context,
and the expected costs from false negatives predictably higher. If
so, this provides a rationale, in an appropriate case, for excusing IP
defendants from liability on the basis of harms that would be
unduly speculative or noncognizable in antitrust.
B. H, and H2 in Antitrust Law
In assessing whether E(H) exceeds E(H) in the antitrust context,
a court must engage in careful factual analysis. First, it must be
reasonably sure that H, is real, not merely some phantom harm. To
be sure, in some cases involving per se liability, such as naked pricefixing, the court may dispense with the need to define the market
and prove market power resulting in deadweight loss. This strategy
makes sense as a means for reducing adjudication costs, because in
the absence of power over a definable market, antitrust defendants
normally would have no reason to enter into such an agreement in
the first place. In most other cases, however, market definition and
proof of market power are required to ensure that the potential H,
harm is real. As a result, one of the more contentious issues in
antitrust today involves the concept of harm to so-called "innovation
markets," in accordance with which a transaction or practice is
subject to challenge on the ground that it may inhibit future
innovation. 16The government's case against Microsoft, for example,
176. According to the IP Guidelines,
[a] licensing arrangement may have competitive effects on innovation that
cannot be adequately addressed through the analysis of goods or technology
markets. For example, the arrangement may affect the development of goods
that do not yet exist. Alternatively, the arrangement may affect the development
of new or improved goods or processes in geographic markets where there is no
actual or likely potential competition in the relevant goods.
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involved allegations that Microsoft's business practices threatened
to inhibit innovation in the software and middleware markets.'7 7
And on occasion the FTC has considered the effect on innovation
markets in deciding whether to challenge horizontal mergers.'
Concern over innovation markets in the antitrust context is
nevertheless controversial precisely because H, is relatively speculative, in comparison with the harm at issue in a typical antitrust
case.

1 79

At the same time, antitrust courts must pay close attention to the
potential harm from false positives. In evaluating conduct that has
both pro- and anticompetitive potential, courts must consider both
the frequency of potential errors and the magnitude of those errors.
The latter can be substantial, not only because the harm resulting
from a decrease in allocative efficiency is serious in and of itself,
but also because various aspects of antitrust law tend to magnify
the impact of that harm. 8 ° For example, courts automatically
treble antitrust damages and award attorneys' fees to the successful plaintiff."8 ' Treble damages awards in particular raise a risk of
overdeterring firms from engaging in conduct that promises
some efficiency gains, but that may be difficult for a court to distinguish from anticompetitive conduct.8 2 Other potential sources
IP GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 3.2.3, at 10-11. The DOJ and the FTC have asserted potential
harm to innovation markets as a basis for proceeding with actions against both Microsoft and
Intel, among others, and for imposing conditions for the approval of some mergers. See Davis,
supra note 22, at 687-94; Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the
Agencies? The Intellectual PropertyGuidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 47-82
(2001). Defenders of the innovation markets concept argue that the potential harm at issue
is substantial, and that traditional antitrust doctrines are not sufficient to protect against it.
See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, IncorporatingDynamic Efficiency Concerns in
Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 587 (1995); Tom &
Newberg, supranote 3, at 222-28. Critics contend that the harm is unduly speculative, given
how little we know about the optimal conditions for inducing innovation, and that
conventional antitrust tools can deal with provable harm. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 17,
at 370-72; Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplicationof the Innovation Market Approach to Merger
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 37-46 (1995).
177. See Brief for Appellees United States and State Plaintiffs at 16-20, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213); Brief for United States

at 31, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-5030).
178. See Davis, supra note 22, at 687-94.
179. See supra note 176.

180. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 17, at 387.
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(d) (2000).
182. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 17, at 387.
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of overdeterrence include the potential for criminal penalties;'
additional civil sanctions, such as the risk of indirect purchaser
suits under state law;l" and other costs including the impact
upon management time and share prices." 5 Yet another concern,
especially in cases involving unilateral conduct, is the social cost
of having courts or agencies monitor compliance with court
orders.8 6 Finally, in cases involving the alleged anticompetitive use
of IP rights, there is an additional risk that an aggressive antitrust
policy might have a negative impact on innovation by decreasing the
expected returns from the exercise of IP rights. Thus, even if E(H 1)
appears to exceed E(H), an antitrust court arguably should be
reluctant to intervene unless it is confident that the risk of a false
positive is low.
C. H, and H 2 in IP Law
In considering whether E(H) is greater than E(H 2) in the IP
context, a court similarly must engage in careful analysis of the
relevant harms. Consider first the potential H2 harms. As in the
antitrust context, H 2 may include static efficiency losses. For
example, in cases involving allegations of patent or copyright
misuse, a ruling for the IP defendant may deprive the parties of
efficient means of reducing transaction costs, such as pools or
package licensing, or of financing, such as by extending the royalty
term past the term of protection. But not all IP cases involve
potential static efficiency losses. It is difficult to perceive, for
183. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).

184. Federal antitrust law forbids courts from awarding antitrust damages to indirect
purchasers, so as to avoid overlapping or inconsistent damages awards. See Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31 (1977). State antitrust laws, however, often permit indirect
purchaser suits, thus raising a potential overdeterrence problem. See William H. Page, Class
Certification in the Microsoft Indirect Purchaser Litigation, at 4, 47, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=671048.
185. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 17, at 387; see also Meurer, supra note 9, at 1875
(arguing that antitrust presents greater incentives than does IP law for "opportunistic or
anticompetitive litigation").
186. Even outside the IP context, courts are often unsympathetic to claims that a
monopolist's "unilateral refusal to deal" violates section 2 of the Sherman Act, partially out
of concern that a ruling for the antitrust plaintiff may require the imposition and subsequent
supervision of the terms of an ongoing business relationship. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 242 (2d ed. 2001).
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example, what short-term efficiency losses would result from a
ruling for the IP defendant in a case such as Sega or Sony, in which
the IP plaintiff asserts the unilateral right to, forbid others from
copying its software for the purpose of reverse engineering.18 v A
ruling for the defendant should have, if anything, a net positive
effect on static efficiency, by eliminating any deadweight loss (H 1)
attributable to the IP; and, because a judgment excusing the IP
defendant from liability effectively awards that defendant a royaltyfree license, the cost of monitoring compliance typically should be
lower than in many antitrust settings. 188
There are, however, other components of H, that must be
considered in the IP context; most prominent is the potential harm
to dynamic efficiency. Weakening the IP right in one case reduces
others' ex ante incentives to create, publish, or invest in goodwill, to
some degree, and this reduction in incentives may mean that future
consumers will have fewer choices than they otherwise would have.
This potential harm is at least theoretically present in every IP
case; and while it may be unquantifiable, the IP system is largely
premised upon the assumption-right or wrong- that this harm is,
in general, substantial. Otherwise, from a purely instrumental
perspective, there would be no need for IP rights in the first place.
Policymakers also should take into consideration other possible
future harms-for example, that IP owners will try to circumvent
application of a procompetitive doctrine, such as a ruling that
reverse engineering constitutes fair use, by adopting practices that
evade condemnation but which raise other costs, such as making
their products more difficult to reverse engineer. Ideally, the cost
incurred to make the product more difficult to crack, as well as the
cost incurred by reverse engineers in response, would be weighed in
187. See supra notes 110-30 and accompanying text.
188. To be more precise, if the immediate consequence of a fair use or misuse ruling is that
the IP is unenforceable in whole or in part, then in one sense there is no short-run H loss.
But this may be a myopic perspective. An IP owner's next-best alternative to enforcing its IP
rights might increase social costs even higher than enforcement would raise them. See infra
notes 268-71 and accompanying text; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of
Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 166, 172 (1994) (suggesting that enforceable
patent rights serve as an umbrella for the transfer of unpatented technology). Whether these
consequences are characterized as short-run, long-run, or intermediate, however, matters
little to the basic point-namely, that invalidating a challenged restriction may impose H2
costs which must be compared with the H costs of not invalidating the restriction.
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comparison with whatever cost reductions reverse engineering
gives rise to. 8 9
Nevertheless, the assumption that the dynamic-efficiency
component of H2 is in general substantial does not imply that this
component is always substantial. If a tribunal can be confident that
the expected value of H 2, including both the static and dynamic
components, in a specific case is low or at least lower than the
expected value of H,, excusing the IP defendant from liability would
appear to enhance social welfare. To be sure, the tribunal should be
extremely careful in making such assessments so as to avoid costly
false positives. It is often claimed, for example, that only a small
percentage of the money invested in pharmaceutical research
results in the development of a commercially successful drugthough how much actually is invested remains an open question.'
In considering the value of the patent incentive, then, one needs
to take into account the number of "dry holes" from which no
patentable invention was forthcoming."9 ' Another caveat is the
possibility of a 'lottery effect," that is, that some inventors and
creators really are motivated by the small ex ante probability of
earning vast rewards from their creations; reducing those rewards
because they appear excessive ex post may have the unintended
consequence of deterring risky innovation.'9 2 Even so, scholars have
analyzed a handful of settings in which the ex post return on
investment may well be sufficient to induce comparable investment
on the part of others, even if legal doctrine caps that return to some
extent.' If courts can identify cases exhibiting these characteristics
189. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 134, at 1625. Alternatively, as explained
below, reverse engineering may render IP owners' attempts to price-discriminate ineffective.
See infra note 271.
190. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1616 (2003) (noting the high expense of research and development in the
pharmaceutical industry).
191. See Katz, supra note 2, at 20-21.
192. See Scherer, supra note 21, at 19-21. In many institutional settings, however,
managers may be more risk-averse than the risk-loving individuals considered by Scherer.
193. This assumes, however, that other potential creators and producers perceive the
exception as being applied in such a way that they have little to fear if they are subjected to
similar treatment in the future. To the extent an exception is perceived as having been
wrongly or inconsistently applied, there is a greater risk of impact upon future incentives. See
James A.D. White, Misuse or Fair Use: That Is the Software Copyright Question, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 251,279 (1997). I attempt above to isolate situations in which both the actual and
perceived frequency and magnitude of false positive errors may be minimal.
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with reasonable confidence, both the frequency and magnitude of
false positives associated with harm to dynamic efficiency should be
low. They include the following.
Cases in which network effects arepresent.A network effect is said
to exist whenever "the utility that a user derives from consumption
of a good increases with the number of other agents consuming the
good."'19 4 The most direct example is the telephone, which is useless
if only one user is connected to the phone network.'95 But network
effects also may be generated by other products or services that
become industry standards. Many aspects of computer technology,
for example, including operating systems and some applications
programs and applications program interfaces, may exhibit network
effects.'96 Of course, the presence of network effects with respect to
a product that embodies IP rights is not a sufficient condition to
ignore the IP rights. The potential for exploiting those rights may
have been the necessary inducement for entering the risky standards competition that the plaintiff happened to win-and that
other potential standard-bearers lost.' Because the rewards can
be so disproportionately large, however-as can the potential for
anticompetitive harm, which will factor into the value of H1
below-the presence of network effects should be a relevant factor
in computing the balance. All other things being equal, restricting
the exercise of an IP right that, by the time the restriction is
entered, already has earned the owner substantial returns, may not
create a disincentive for others to invest in creating their own IP.198

194. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implicationsof Network Economic Effects,
86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998) (quoting Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities,Competition,and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985)).
195. See id. at 488-91.
196. See id. at 491-92; O'Rourke, supra note 135, at 1179, 1212, 1217; Samuelson &
Scotchmer, supra note 134, at 1617; Weiser, supra note 133, at 568-83.
197. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 194, at 530; O'Rourke, supra note 135, at 1217;
Weiser, supranote 133, at 586.
198. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 194, at 530, 604; O'Rourke, supra note 135, at
1217; Weiser, supra note 133, at 591-92; White, supra note 193, at 277-79. Courts still need
to be careful, however. Ensuring access to a technologically inferior standard may simply
enable that standard to maintain its dominance; it may be better to promote competition
among standards. See David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age:
Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 771, 848-49 (1996); Weiser, supra note 133, at 590.
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Cases in which other incentives are present. In other instances, it
may be reasonable to conclude that other incentives beside the IP
rights at issue are sufficient to induce others to create, publish, or
invest. For example, the amount invested in a specific creative
process may be so low that no significant free-rider problem exists
at all, particularly if the creator has a first-mover advantage. Some
minimally creative works, such as the sweepstakes instructions at
issue in Morrissey v. Procter& Gamble Co.,199 might fall within this
category. 00 In the patent arena, scholars have expressed doubt as
to whether the patent incentive is necessary to induce the creation
and disclosure of subject matter such as business methods.2"'
Similarly, if other incentives such as direct or indirect government
funding are present, the need for an additional boost from patent
law may be small.20 2 The presence of other IP protection also may be
relevant. Reducing or even eliminating protection for trade dress,
for example, may have little impact upon firms' incentives to invest
in quality control, assuming that most products are sold in connection with other source identifiers such as word marks. Thus, even
if others can copy my distinctive product design, I may have a
sufficient incentive to produce goods of consistent quality, as long as
I continue to market those goods under my brand name.20 3
Cases in which the term of the right has been extended retroactively. Yet another setting in which the dynamic component of H 2
might be small is when the IP plaintiff is the beneficiary of a
windfall increase in the term of protection. As an example of this
phenomenon, consider the Copyright Term Extension Act, which
199. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
200. Alternatively, authors and publishers of works they believe to be divinely inspired
might have reason to disseminate those works, even in the absence of a copyright incentive.
See Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy: Copyright, Censorship,and Religious Pluralism,
91 CAL. L. REv. 323, 362-63 (2003) (discussing disputes over copyright in purportedly
scriptural works).
201. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?,
16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275 (2000) (arguing that businesses do
not need added incentives to disclose).
202. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch,82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1668-70 (1996).
203. To be sure, consumers may encounter the product without its brand name; this
possibility is the rationale for protecting trade dress owners from the likelihood of post-sale
confusion. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
infra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing the incentive to invest in quality control).
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added twenty years to the copyright term both for future works and
for existing works that were still under copyright protection as of
1998.204 The likelihood that this extension serves a public purpose
with respect to future works is slim, given the small present value
of an additional twenty years' worth of protection in the distant
future; °5 the likelihood that it serves a public purpose with respect
to existing works is even slimmer, though theoretically possible. 6
Even with proper deference to Congress's contrary judgment that
the extension serves a public purpose, however, a court rationally
could conclude that the impact on incentives of deciding a close fair
use case, involving a work that is within the last twenty years of
its term, in favor of the IP defendant is de minimis. °7 On the other
hand, Congress generally authorizes patent term extensions only
upon proof that the economic life of a patent has been shortened,
due to regulatory or PTO delay. 0 8 For a court to apply the misuse
doctrine more liberally during an extended patent term, on the
theory that applying the doctrine in such a way will have no effect
upon the relevant patent incentive, might be a more substantial
intrusion on congressional judgment.
Whatever the value of H 2 might be, the other side of the coin is
H, and here too some IP cases may depart in significant ways from
the typical antitrust case. In the IP context, H, would include
deadweight loss whenever the IP at issue confers a measure of
204. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304
(2000)); see also William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, FairUse and Statutory Reform in the
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639,1646 (2004) (asserting that restricting windfalls impairs
no incentive).
205. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 265-66 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Copyright Term Extension Act "goes too far").
206. In rejecting a constitutional challenge to the act, the Supreme Court accepted as
possible justifications the possibilities that past authors may have been motivated to create
in light of the possibility of future term extensions, and that term extensions may provide an
incentive to republish or restore works which otherwise would fall into the public domain,
forgotten and unrestored. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07.
207. Some scholars have argued that the scope of fair use should expand as a work ages,
citing among other reasons the attenuating effect on incentives. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use
Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 800 (2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A
Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REv. 409, 433-46 (2002). Neither I nor these scholars are advocating
that courts simply ignore Congress's judgment. But because fair use invites consideration of
many factors in deciding whether to excuse a defendant from liability, it may not be
unacceptable to consider, among other things, the waning impact on incentives over time.
208. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(b)(1)(C), 155-156 (2000).
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market power-which may, however, constitute only a subset of all
IP cases. Even so, it is worth noting that in some cases involving IP
rights the magnitude of H1 is likely to be quite large. In particular,
when network effects are present, the deadweight loss resulting
from the exercise of the right may be substantial. 20 9 Moreover,
network effects may facilitate the exercise of tying and other
anticompetitive strategies which, in more run-of-the-mill cases,
are unlikely to cause anticompetitive harm.2 10 In addition, there
may be reasons to include within H1 a variety of harms that would
not be cognizable, often or at all, in the antitrust context. n When
the following harms are present, the mean value of H, may be
greater than one might, at first blush, expect.
Small or transitorycompetitive harms.As we have seen, antitrust
law generally does not concern itself with competitive harms that
are believed to fall below some threshold. For example, for purposes
of defining a market, the courts and agencies typically focus on
whether a five percent price increase could be sustained for the
"foreseeable future. 2 12 As a result, contemporary antitrust law for
the most part rejects the notion that courts should concern them209. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98. Even in cases not involving network
effects, deadweight loss may be high if the IP at issue occupies a distinct market. On the other
hand, if the IP owner can price discriminate, it may have an incentive to do so and thus
eliminate some deadweight loss. See Ariel Katz, A Network Effects Perspective on Software
Piracy,55 U. TORONTO L.J. 155, 187 (2005).
210. In recent years, economists have identified situations in which it may be possible to
leverage a monopoly in one product market into a monopoly in another market. See, e.g.,
Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying To Preserve and Create
Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002) (describing "how a
monopolist of a product in the current period can use tying to preserve its monopoly in the
future"); Jay Pil Choi, Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements3 (CESifo Working Paper No.
1336, 2004), availableat http'//ssrn.com/abstract=629001 (describing "[tihe anti-competitive
role of tying'). Absent the conditions identified in works such as these, however, economists
generally remain skeptical that tying is likely to facilitate monopoly leveraging.
211. Cf. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003) (arguing that patent misuse doctrine can take into account
harms that antitrust does not recognize, including the social "waste that can occur with
defensive research or inventing around a patent," "the burden on innovation that can result
from an overproliferation of patent rights," and "the disincentives to innovation that can
result from allocating reward to early-stage inventors over late-stage inventors"). Although
I agree with Professor Feldman that misuse doctrine sometimes should be more sensitive
than antitrust to harm to innovation, I am less sanguine than she about an expansive role for
misuse in combating the harms she lists. See infra Part IV.
212. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § 1.11, at 7.
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selves with so-called "submarkets.'2 15 To be sure, the harm accruing
from a one percent price increase for a short period of time is no less
real than the harm accruing from a five percent increase; it is just
that the harm is not deemed substantial enough to merit antitrust
scrutiny, with its attendant adjudication costs and the ever-present
risk of false positives. Even so, it does not necessarily follow that IP
law should never be deployed as a counter to such relatively minor
harm. In theory, if E(H2) is low enough, E(H) may exceed E(H2)
even though the value of E(H) would not be "substantial" for
antitrust purposes.2 14 On the other hand, even if E(H) appears to
exceed E(H), the decisionmaker may not be sufficiently confident
of this result; and the expected cost of further investigation may
counsel against efforts to fine-tune the analysis. All other things
being equal, in such a case the burden of proof may determine which
side prevails.
Aggregate Competitive Harm. Proceeding from the above example,
the case for exempting the IP defendant from liability may be
stronger if E(H), though small in the case at bar, is potentially
large in the aggregate. To illustrate, suppose that there are five
possible designs for a product that inhabits a discrete product
213. Older antitrust cases sometimes refer to the potential for anticompetitive harm within
submarkets. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (describing
submarkets and their relation to the product market). Occasionally such language creeps into
more recent case law as well. Most contemporary courts and scholars, however, take the view
that "there are no submarkets, only markets." Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old
Brown Shoe: In QualifiedPraiseof Submarkets, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 206 (2000).
214. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current LegislationAffecting PatentMisuse, 70
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 793,800 (1988) (stating, in support of the continued viability
of the patent misuse doctrine, that the often very limited, or "thin," markets for patented
technology make it difficult to apply antitrust law's consumer-demand definition of the
relevant market). Of course, one could ask why, in theory, antitrust too should not condemn
conduct that threatens a small amount of anticompetitive harm, in a case in which the
expected cost of a false positive is zero. One answer is that antitrust already may condemn
such minimal harm in the subset of cases in which proof of market harm is not required, for
example, with respect to per se offenses such as naked price-fixing. It typically does not do so
with respect to more ambiguous conduct that is analyzed under the rule of reason, because
antitrust enforcement carries with it numerous collateral social costs, as described above. In
the IP context, by contrast, by hypothesis the plaintiff has already commenced litigation, and
thus consideration of a procompetitive defense will add to adjudication costs only at the
margin. Moreover, to the extent that any of the procompetitive doctrines lend themselves to
relatively bright-line application, as perhaps the functionality doctrine does, then adjudication
costs should be generally low because rational IP owners will choose to initiate litigation only
when they are reasonably certain to prevail against such doctrine.
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market, or five equally marketable ways of expressing a given idea.
According exclusive trademark or copyright rights to any one of the
five alternatives might not cause much competitive harm, in and of
itself, as long as the other four remain available to competitors.
E(H), viewed atomistically, is still small. Indeed, even if all five
alternatives wind up in private hands, there may not be a substantial competitive effect; five independent firms may define a
reasonably competitive market.2 1 ' The risk of anticompetitive harm
increases, however, the fewer firms there are; and if access to at
least one of the five alternatives is indispensable to competition
within the relevant product market, the five firms effectively have
created a barrier to entry.21 6 Conceivably, even a relatively small
probability of substantial aggregate H harm might be sufficient to
outweigh a low risk of H 2 harm. By contrast, unilateral conduct that
does not threaten substantial competitive harm would rarely, if
ever, be an appropriate subject of antitrust scrutiny, even if similar
conduct in the aggregate would result in social losses, as long as the
firms engaging in the conduct are not expressly or implicitly
colluding with one another.
Harm to Innovation Markets. As noted above, an innovation
market is a market for a product that does not yet exist but which
may exist in the future if innovation proceeds in some expected
fashion. Although the concept has been deployed in a smattering of
antitrust cases, even the strongest defenders of the innovation
market concept are chary about extending its reach too far. The
potential for false positives and the magnitude of adjudication
costs are simply too great to expect antitrust enforcers to make use
of the innovation market concept under many circumstances.2 17 A
215. Cf. IP GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4.3, at 23 (stating that the agencies normally will
not challenge a restraint involving an innovation market if, inter alia, there are five
independent firms within that market).
216. On the other hand, one might argue that each of the five IP owners in the above
hypothetical has a strong incentive to license its IP to a would-be user, out of fear that if it
does not do so one of its rivals will. If so, then perhaps a better reason for being concerned
about a small number of rights holders potentially controlling all manifestations of a product
design or an idea is simply that the aggregate transaction costs, resulting from would-be users
having to deal with at least one of those rights holders in order to compete in the relevant
market, may exceed the marginal incentive-related benefits of permitting those rights to be
asserted. The rationale for limiting the IP owner's rights therefore may relate more to cost
reduction than to promoting competition as such.
217. See 1 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN
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similarly cautious approach, however, may not be appropriate in
some IP cases. For example, suppose that one could say with
confidence that there is a thirty percent probability of incurring
an H, harm of $10,000,000. E(H) would be $3,000,000. If one also
could be confident that E(H) is less than $3,000,000, then the
appropriate response would be to excuse the IP defendant from
liability, despite the fact that the probability of incurring the H1
harm is less than fifty percent. Particularly when network effects
are present, this may well be a plausible outcome. In such a case,
E(H) is likely to be large in an absolute sense. In addition, the
presence of network effects may make it plausible for the IP owner
to successfully engage in conduct that otherwise would be unlikely
to succeed, such as the use of tying or bundling to preserve or extend
monopoly power."' At the same time, the presence of network
effects also may suggest that E(H) is low, because the IP owner's
return on investment in creating a winning standard far outweighs
the cost of development; in appropriately delineated cases, both the
frequency and magnitude of false positive errors may be minimal.
Cases such as Sega may fall within this framework, to the extent
that exclusive control over the interface at issue might have enabled
the plaintiff to control follow-up innovation without plausible
corresponding benefits to consumers.2 1 s
THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 5 (1996) (cautioning that "innovation market

analysis is not always appropriate," and that "innovation market analysis should be applied
only where the innovation is directed toward a particular good and where the innovation can
be associated with specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms").
218. See supra note 210.
219. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text; see also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
Engineeringand the Rise of ElectronicVigilantism: IntellectualPropertyImplicationsof'"LockOut"Programs,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1192-94 (1995) (arguing that misuse doctrine may be

better tailored than antitrust to account for harm to innovation); Ramsey Hanna, Note,
Misusing Antitrust: The Search for FunctionalCopyrightMisuse Standards,46 STAN. L. REV.
401, 418-19 (1994) (arguing that copyright and antitrust laws are incompatible); Note, Is the
Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1922, 1935-39 (1997) (arguing that the
misuse doctrine has a "larger scope" than antitrust).
Note also that courts sometimes apply the doctrines I refer to as "procompetitive" for
reasons other than to promote economic competition-for example, to promote free speech
interests. I have no quarrel with this practice in cases in which free speech or other important
noneconomic interests are at stake. From the standpoint of the First Amendment, promoting
diversity of expression may be valued for its own sake, even when there are good economic
substitutes for the speech in question. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and
'MarketPower' in the Marketplace of Ideas, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND
US PERSPECTIVES 149 (Frangois L~v~que & Howard Shelanski eds. 2005); Kathryn Judge,
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In summary, there may be instances in which an IP court should
excuse the IP defendant for the purpose of promoting competition,
on the basis of potential harms that would not be relevant in an
antitrust context. And there may be other, more general reasons for
antitrust courts to be more cautious in their assessment of the
relevant costs and benefits of intervention, as compared with IP
courts. A false positive in an antitrust case means that the defendant has been wrongly adjudged guilty of violating a federal law,
which, in theory, can carry criminal penalties. A false positive in the
IP setting means only that the IP plaintiff has been wrongly denied
the vindication of its rights. To the extent that the antitrust false
positive carries with it a greater stigma, greater caution may be
warranted in the antitrust arena. Moreover, as David McGowan
notes, antitrust is concerned with the competitive process, whereas
IP law is more concerned with outcomes-that is, producing the
"right" amount of innovation.2 2 ° A generally more aggressive
approach to anticompetitive harm-focusing on specific outcomes of
the competitive process-therefore might make sense in the IP
context. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how closely the
theoretical observations above can be applied to real-world doctrines. The following Part addresses this issue.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR

IP'S PROCOMPETITIVE DOCTRINES

The analysis above suggests that there can be instances in which
the expected benefits of invoking a procompetitive doctrine to excuse
liability outweigh the expected costs, even though those costs would
be too speculative to form the basis of an antitrust claim. In this
Part, I apply the model developed above to the doctrines discussed
in Part II. My overarching claim is that, notwithstanding the
theoretical observations presented above, the number of cases in
which courts should apply procompetitive doctrine to protect
"submarkets," aggregate markets, or innovation markets, in a more
Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REv. 901 (2004) (discussing the differing
treatment courts have given to misuse doctrine). Excusing the defendant from liability,
therefore, might advance competition in the broader sense of competition in the market of
ideas, even though it has no impact on competition in a sense that is cognizable for antitrust
purposes.
220. See McGowan, supra note 198, at 777.
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aggressive manner than antitrust would contemplate, is probably
small. More frequently, antitrust-like standards should govern
when litigants ask courts to vindicate competitive need in IP cases.
To the extent that courts sometimes should excuse IP defendants
from liability so as to promote competitive ends, however, the
application of either fair use or a more narrowly crafted misuse
doctrine would be preferable to the misuse doctrine as it currently
exists. I also argue that the Supreme Court's gloss on trademark's
functionality doctrine, an approach not grounded in antitrust,
probably does promote social welfare, but that an even better
response might be to eliminate trademark protection for trade dress
altogether.
A. ProcompetitiveTools in Patentand Copyright
In this Section, I take up the issue of whether courts might be
justified in applying misuse, fair use, or merger so as to promote
competition, even in the absence of demonstrable market harm. I
begin by arguing that misuse doctrine, as it currently exists, gives
rise to two problems that render most applications of the doctrine
inherently suspect. Notwithstanding these problems, I then consider
two situations in which misuse or other doctrines nevertheless
might promote social welfare by enhancing competition in ways
that depart from antitrust standards: first, by overriding IP-ownerimposed restrictions on reverse engineering; and second, by
frustrating efforts on the part of IP owners to engage in price
discrimination by, for example, attempting to override the first-sale
doctrine. I contend that, in some but not all instances, IP law should
negate restrictions on reverse engineering, even without proof of
antitrust harm; that the theoretical framework described above does
not typically provide a sufficiently strong case for restricting efforts
on the part of IP owners to price discriminate; and that, in cases in
which excusing the defendant from liability is warranted, fair use
(if available) would be preferable to misuse as a doctrinal tool,
unless courts incorporate a standing limitation into the latter. I
conclude with some observations on whether it would be useful to
incorporate further investigation of market harms into the application of fair use, misuse, and merger as procompetitive tools.
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1. Two Problems with Misuse
A first problem with applying the misuse doctrine against conduct
that does not constitute an antitrust violation is that the potential
harms from a false positive will often be just as great as, or even
greater than, the analogous harms would be in an antitrust
setting. 22' As we have seen, allegations of misuse are almost always
based upon contractual provisions of one sort or another. But even
those provisions that are characterized as misuse per se, such as
terms requiring the payment of postexpiration royalties and some
forms of tying arrangements, typically exhibit countervailing static
efficiencies; and practices that fall within the misuse doctrine's rule
of reason, such as grantbacks, pools, and field-of-use restrictions,
are perhaps even more likely to exhibit such efficiencies. Using the
terminology developed in the preceding Part, the loss of these
potential benefits comprises a major part of H.. The other part of H 2,
also important, consists of harm to the patent or copyright incentive
structure. Unless the decisionmaker can be confident that both
parts of H 2 are small, condemning the conduct at issue as misuse
will be difficult to justify. As for H, if the deadweight loss component is substantial enough, antitrust concerns may arise without
the need to consider misuse. But often there will be little reason to
expect the other possible components of H, to be sufficiently large to
justify resort to the misuse doctrine, in a case in which antitrust
would not apply. In the typical patent misuse case, for example,
there is unlikely to be any significant, noneconomic, free-speech
value at stake; and while a ruling for the plaintiff might cause
potential harm to a "submarket," an aggregate market, or an
innovation market, the presence of countervailing H 2 harm should
counsel in favor of at least as much caution as would be exercised in
the antitrust context.
A second problem is that, because a finding of misuse renders the
patent or copyright unenforceable in its entirety, deploying misuse
to combat small or speculative competitive harms creates a
221. In cases in which the alleged misuse also would constitute an antitrust violation, the

application of the doctrine is less problematic, but also arguably unnecessary given the
viability of antitrust enforcement; and even in these cases there is a risk that the misuse
doctrine will result in overdeterrence, conflicting judgments, or other problems, absent a
standing limitation.
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substantial risk of overdeterrence. Suppose, for example, that a
court were to conclude that a contract, which required that the user
of a copyrighted work not engage in fair use or reverse engineering,
constitutes a misuse of the copyright. According to most courts that
have applied the misuse doctrine, the copyright would then be
unenforceable in its entirety-even as against a defendant whose
use was not fair, and even if, as in Lasercomb,22 2 the defendant was
not a party to the agreement embodying the requirement. In all but
the most egregious instances, this departure from the standing
principles common to both antitrust and the doctrine of unclean
hands seems imprudent, insofar as it risks invalidating copyrights
without sufficient input from the parties directly affected by the
restriction at issue. It also results in the imposition of a sanction on
the copyright owner that, in some cases, will bear no relationship to
the magnitude of the harm caused by the restriction.2 2 3 A more
reasonable interpretation of misuse in both the patent and copyright
contexts would limit its application to matters that relate to the acts
or transactions at issue in the litigation, in much the way that
unclean hands is limited within the law of restitution.2 24 The other
alternative would be to discard misuse altogether and to rely
instead on a properly reformulated fair use or preemption doctrine,
or simply to hold offending contractual provisions unenforceable as
a matter of public policy. The potential collateral damage from the
application of the misuse doctrine as currently formulated, however,
is simply too great, if a narrower approach is available.

222. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
223. Perversely, the lack of a nexus between harm and penalty might sometimes have the
opposite effect of underdeterring anticompetitive conduct. Attempts to limit fair use or use
of public-domain materials appear to be widespread; it is not difficult, for example, to find
works bearing notices that purport to prohibit their reproduction even in part. See Patry &
Posner, supra note 204, at 1654-57. Some of these attempts to restrict users may result in
anticompetitive harm, but courts may be reluctant to characterize the restrictions as misuse
if the penalty is unenforceability of the copyright tout court.
224. Several commentators have made this observation. See, e.g., Cohen & Lemley, supra
note 71, at 32 (arguing that to allow "reasonable uses of ... purchased software" is consistent
with patent policy); James A. Kobak, Jr., A Sensible Doctrine of Misuse for Intellectual
Property Cases, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 37-38 (1992) (recommending "a limited misuse
rule"); Douglas Lichtman, PropertyRights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 615, 636-37 (2000) (calling penalties for misuse "draconian" in some patent cases); cf
Judge, supra note 219, at 950-51 (suggesting that courts can avoid overdeterrence by
permitting the copyright plaintiff to recover damages but not injunctive relief).
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2. Restrictions on Reverse Engineering
Notwithstanding my reservations about misuse doctrine generally, it remains conceivable that there are situations in which
misuse or other doctrines might play a role in promoting competition in ways that would elude antitrust. A leading candidate for
such a case would be one in which the IP owner attempts to prevent
others from engaging in reverse engineering, either by claiming that
the act of reverse engineering constitutes patent or copyright
infringement, or by selling or licensing products incorporating the
owner's IP upon condition that the purchaser or licensee agree not
to reverse engineer the product."' A large scholarly literature
argues that at least some forms of reverse engineering should be
lawful, regardless of the IP owner's objections. Pamela Samuelson
and Suzanne Scotchmer, for example, argue that first-mover
advantages and the cost of reverse engineering usually provide the
IP owner a sufficient opportunity to recoup investment; and
therefore that a rule permitting reverse engineering provides a
smaller, but still adequate, incentive to invent and disclose. 226 A
right to reverse engineer is particularly apt to result in a greater
social surplus when network effects are present, again because the
rewards to the IP owner are likely to be adequate and the social cost
of permitting the IP owner to impede follow-up innovation is likely
to be substantial.227 A rule forbidding reverse engineering, by
225. So far, questions concerning the legality of reverse engineering a patented invention
have not arisen much in practice for several reasons. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 71, at
21-25; O'Rourke, supra note 135, at 1227; Robinson, supra note 15, at 1510 n.219. But patent
owners may expressly restrict certain uses, in which case, as in Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the question arises whether the restriction trumps the
first-sale doctrine. As far as copyright is concerned, the question may arise, as in Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), and Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000), whether intermediate
copying of software for the purpose of reverse engineering constitutes infringement or fair use;
or, as in Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.
2003), whether restrictions on data extraction constitute misuse. Finally, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) permits the unauthorized circumvention of technological
measures that restrict access to or use of copyrighted works for some but not all reverse
engineering purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000). Efforts to expand the scope of the IP
owner's rights under the DMCA could conceivably give rise to an "anticircumvention misuse"
doctrine. See Burk, supra note 85, at 1140.
226. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 134, at 1621.
227. See id. at 1621-26.
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contrast, might increase deadweight loss and the cost of follow-up
innovation.2 28 On balance, they argue, permitting reverse engineering is probably, though not conclusively, efficient in most instances,
and courts should be skeptical of efforts to override the right,
especially in nonnegotiated contracts. 9
That said, some scholars who support a right to reverse engineer
in some cases have expressed reservations over interpreting this
right too broadly. One possible drawback is that applying a right to
reverse engineer with respect to a patented or copyrighted work
before it becomes dominant may impede socially beneficial incentives, either by encouraging cloning 3 ° or by discouraging efficient
coordination of follow-up applications. 231' A related point is that,
unless legal or contractual restrictions on reverse engineering are
widespread within a given industry, there may be little anticompetitive effect from the occasional restriction-although a focus
on aggregate impact would be consistent with the analysis provided
above. Second, some scholars caution that while a right to reverse
engineer for the purpose of creating a product that is complementary to an existing platform may be beneficial, both to society
generally (particularly if the product to be engineered has a
dominant market position) and to the IP owner specifically (because
complements may exacerbate network effects),2 32 a right to reverse
engineer for the purpose of creating a product that competes with an
existing platform is less sound. In the latter case, reverse engineering may enhance social welfare, particularly if the product to be
reverse engineered has already achieved market dominance, but the
228. See id.
229. See id. As stated, however, the effect on incentives depends on reverse engineering
being sufficiently time-consuming and difficult that IP owners have a sufficient opportunity
to recoup their costs; the easier reverse engineering becomes, the more likely that it will
negatively impact incentives. See id. at 1585-89. Moreover, permitting reverse engineering
may encourage duplicative efforts to reverse engineer, or efforts on the part of IP owners to
make it more difficult to reverse engineer their products. Either response threatens to reduce
the social benefits of reverse engineering. See id. at 1625.
230. See Weiser, supra note 133, at 567, 591; see also O'Rourke, supra note 16, at 510
(arguing that a right to reverse engineer software invites abuse, insofar as the reverse
engineer will obtain copyrightable expression along with uncopyrightable data).
231. See Lichtman, supra note 224, at 634. But see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and
Price Discrimination,23 CARDoZO L. REv. 55, 126 (2001) (expressing skepticism over this
argument); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 134, at 1624 & n.225 (expressing similar
skepticism).
232. See O'Rourke, supra note 16, at 514; Weiser, supra note 133, at 565-66.
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specific facts will be important; a right to reverse engineer in all
cases may have a negative impact upon the decision to invest in
creating the initial product.23 3 On this logic, treating Sega, which
involved vertical compatibility, and Sony, which involved horizontal
compatibility, identically may have been a mistake.23 4
But even Sega and Sony do not create a per se right to reverse
engineer, as noted above. In both cases, the court was careful to
articulate that the right would be implicated only if the defendant
reverse engineered for a legitimate purpose-making an identical
end product would almost certainly be illegitimate-and if the
information could not reasonably have been obtained any other
way.2 35 Cabining the "right"to reverse engineer even in this modest
way, however, renders cases such as Lasercomb doubtful. Recall
that the agreement in Lasercomb forbade licensees from developing
computer-assisted die-making software-presumably, whether
they engaged in reverse engineering or not.23 6 Although a ruling
permitting licensees to make compatible products, as in Sega, might
have made sense had that issue been presented, it seems overbroad to condemn the license altogether-and render Lasercomb's
copyright unenforceable-absent further analysis of its anticompetitive effects. To be sure, anticompetitiveeffects may have been
present. The restraints at issue had a very long duration and may
well have suppressed competition in the market for competing
technologies in a way that made consumers worse off. In the
antitrust context, however, evidence of anticompetitive effects, with
233. See O'Rourke, supranote 16, at 510; Weiser, supra note 133, at 567. In other words,
the focus should be not on the nature of the end product (does it infringe, or doesn't it?), but
rather on the impact of applying fair use upon the decision to invest, either in the platform
or in applications for it. If firms typically invest more in creating platforms than in
applications, excusing the defendant from intermediate copying to create a competing
platform might have more significant negative consequences than a ruling that permits such
copying only to create competing applications.
234. See Weiser, supra note 133, at 601-02. But see Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note
134, at 1622 n.220 (arguing that reverse engineering for horizontal competition is much less
common).
235. Sony Computer Entm't Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Davidson &
Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630,636-39 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming judgment that defendants had
breached a promise not to reverse engineer video game software, in a case in which reverse
engineering for the purpose of creating an online gaming environment appears to have
facilitated third parties' unauthorized copying and distribution of the software).
236. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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reference to such factors as Lasercomb's market share and the ease
of entry into that market, would have been necessary to reach that
conclusion.23 And while there may have been potential harm to
innovation markets or to submarkets, the facts presented in the
opinion do not disclose any basis for comparing these harms to the
potential harm to the copyright incentive scheme, of rendering
the copyright unenforceable.23 s Lasercomb may well have been
overreaching, but absent proof of harm to a well-defined market the
application of misuse doctrine in that case, like many others,
arguably degenerates into a dubious exercise in "antitrust lite."
These nuances suggest that a broad rule that reverse engineering
is always a fair use, or that contractual restrictions on reverse
engineering are always a misuse or are otherwise unenforceable,
would sweep too far.239 They also suggest that fair use may have
advantages over other doctrinal tools, insofar as the fair use inquiry
is inherently more flexible than misuse, with its tendency toward
reflexive per se condemnation displayed in Lasercomb and some of
the patent cases, or preemption, which does not easily lend itself to
the balancing of costs and incentives.24 ° Alternatively, a reformed
misuse doctrine that incorporated a standing inquiry into the
analysis might be equally capable of making nuanced decisions; it
also would be easier to fit within a traditional patent law framework, given that patent, unlike copyright, has never developed a fair
use doctrine.
237. See IP GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5.4; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 2, § 21.7e;
Kobak, supra note 224, at 5.
238. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 972.
239. To the extent, however, that a court does characterize a particular type of reverse
engineering as a fair use of a copyrighted work, it seems doubtful that it should permit the
IP owner to condition the use of the work upon the user's agreement not to engage in reverse
engineering, as in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323-28 (Fed. Cir.
2003); see also Davidson & Assocs., 422 F.3d at 639 (citing Bowers with approval). To do so
enables the parties to frustrate the perceived procompetitive benefits, a type of positive
externality, of this application of the fair use doctrine.
240. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of IntellectualProperty
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 157-58 (1999) (noting the difficulty of applying preemption
doctrine so as to take into account the incentive/access tradeoff). This is not the place to delve
deeply into the law of preemption. Suffice to say that federal IP law may preempt state laws,
including the application of state contract law, that would negate important aspects of federal
law; but the legal standards are governed by many technicalities and do not easily lend
themselves to case-by-case consideration of factors such as the magnitude of H2.
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3. Restrictions on PriceDiscrimination
Another difficult problem is presented in cases such as
24 2
Mallinckrodt,Inc. v. Medipart,Inc.,24 1 ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
and Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc." 3 Of these, only Mallinckrodt was litigated as a misuse
case-ProCD was decided on preemption grounds, 44 and Lexmark
on the basis of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)24 5
-but each case involved a variation on a common pattern. In
Mallinckrodt, the plaintiff forbade purchasers of its patented
devices from reusing those devices at all;246 in ProCD,the plaintiff
forbade purchasers of the "consumer product" version of its
uncopyrightable database from using the product for a commercial
purpose;14' and in Lexmark, the plaintiff sold toner cartridges that
were engineered to disable their use in the event they were refilled
by anyone other than Lexmark.2 41 In each case, the plaintiff was
attempting to engage in price discrimination. "Heavy" users of the
device at issue in Mallinckrodt, the database at issue in ProCD,or
the Lexmark printers presumably would value the product more,
and would be willing to pay a higher price for each use of it, than
would "light" users. But it is not easy for the IP owner to exploit this
potential profit opportunity. Offering the product to different users
at different prices is not feasible if heavy users can pass themselves
off as light users, or if light users can buy at a low price and then
resell to high users at a small mark-up.2 49 Alternatively, offering the
product on condition that the user pay a periodic fee based on use
gives rise to monitoring problems. In Mallinckrodtand Lexmark, the
plaintiffs sought to avoid these problems by requiring purchasers to
buy a new product for each use;2 5 in ProCD,the plaintiff instead
241. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
242. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
243. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
244. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1453-54.
245. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551.
246. See Mallinckrodt,976 F.2d at 702.
247. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1450.
248. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 529-30. Lexmark also sold a refillable cartridge at a higher
price. See id. at 530.
249. See ProCD,86 F.3d at 1450.
250. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530; Mallinckrodt,976 F.2d at 702.
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charged different prices to commercial users and noncommercial
users, and forbade the latter from engaging in arbitrage.25 1
The resolution of these cases has been inconsistent. As noted
above, the Federal Circuit held that Mallinckrodt's single-use
policy did not amount to patent misuse, unless the defendant could
establish that the policy violated the rule of reason.2 52 To the same
effect, albeit under a different doctrinal guise, the Seventh Circuit
held that ProCD's policy was enforceable as a matter of state
contract law and was not preempted by federal copyright law." 3
By contrast, in Lexmark the Sixth Circuit held that the DMCA
did not forbid the defendant from circumventing the single use
design feature. 5 4 Antitrust law, however, probably would not have
condemned any of the practices at issue, absent proof of market
power and anticompetitive effect.255 For advocates of price discrimination, antitrust law's reluctance to intervene is just as well. Absent
the pricing strategies employed in these cases, the plaintiffs would
have sold their products at a unitary price higher than the price
offered to "light" users, with the net effect that light users would
have been worse off.2" 6 Antitrust sensibly avoids the false positives
in such cases and, one might argue, IP law would be wise to follow
suit.

251. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1449-50.
252. See Mallinckrodt, 962 F.2d at 708-09.
253. See ProCD,86 F.3d at 1450-55.
254. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 545-51; see also Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192-204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant did not violate the
DMCA by marketing a universal remote control to purchasers of plaintiffs garage door
openers, even though the remotes enabled users to circumvent technology that controlled
access to code embedded in the openers). In a related copyright context, the Ninth Circuit in
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-19 (9th Cir. 1993), held that
merely running a lawfully-made copy of computer software without permission of the
copyright owner creates an infringing copy of the software. This ruling temporarily allowed
some owners of copyrighted software to control aftermarkets for computer repairs, insofar as
repair would entail turning the computer on to see how the system works; but another portion
of the DMCA itself overruled this particular result as it relates to maintenance and repair.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2879 (1998) (amending
17 U.S.C. § 117 to overrule in part MAI Systems Corp.).
255. Nor would the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a-13c, 21a (2000), likely apply,
given its relatively narrow prohibition on price discrimination. See HOVENKAMP, supra note
31, §§ 14.6al, 14.6d; Meurer, supra note 9, at 1882-83.
256. In Mallinckrodt, this would mean selling the device at a single price on the
expectation that it would be used x times before being disposed of.
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There are other considerations to take into account, however,
before reaching a firm conclusion. First, although first-degree price
discrimination, in which a seller with market power offers each
individual buyer the maximum price she is willing to pay above
marginal cost, is economically efficient in comparison with offering
a single price above marginal cost,257 first-degree discrimination is
almost impossible to implement258 and was not at issue in any of the
above cases. Instead, each case involved second-degree discrimination, in which different versions of a product were offered to
consumers at different prices.259 The welfare effects of this latter
type of price discrimination are ambiguous. From the standpoint of
static efficiency, imperfect price discrimination may either increase
or decrease output, and hence social welfare, depending upon the
shape of the relevant demand and cost curves. 2" The effects on
dynamic efficiency are similarly ambiguous. Because price discrimination increases the portion of consumer surplus accruing to the
monopolist, it encourages efforts to obtain monopolies, including IP
monopolies. To the extent that investment in the production of some
IP goods, such as drugs, would be inadequate absent the prospect of
obtaining monopoly rights, this encouragement is beneficial. On the
other hand, to the extent the race to acquire monopoly position
encourages overinvestment and duplicative research, it is socially
wasteful.26 ' Second, even in cases in which price discrimination
increases output over what it otherwise would be, the effect on
dissemination of the goods produced may be ambiguous. In
particular, when price discrimination strategies are permitted to
override the first-sale doctrine, consumers who otherwise would
have obtained the product at below marginal cost, through sharing,
resale, or gift, may lose access to the product.262 For example,
assume that in the absence of price discrimination I would purchase
a product at the monopoly price of $10 and then resell to someone
257. See TIROLE, supra note 19, at 1234-37.
258. See Meurer, supra note 231, at 59.
259. See id. at 71-75. Third-degree price discrimination exists when a supplier offers a
product to different groups at different prices, based on a prediction of different groups'
willingness to pay. See id. at 69-71.
260. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 40,378,389; Meurer, supranote 231, at 73-75.
261. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 378, 389; TIROLE, supra note 19, at 139, 149;
Meurer, supranote 231, at 100-02.
262. See Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TuL. L. REV. 331, 370-71 (2005).
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else for a price below the product's marginal cost. Under a regime
of price discrimination coupled with a restriction on resale or reuse,
I might pay less to obtain the product, but the hypothetical second
owner may not obtain the product at all if she is unwilling to pay a
price at least equal to its marginal cost. This loss to the second
owner may be irrelevant as long as economic efficiency is defined in
terms of willingness to pay.2 6 To the extent that the second owner's
willingness to pay is constrained by her ability to pay, however, or
her use of the product would confer unquantifiable positive
externalities, such as spillover educational benefits, on third parties,
a more expansive social welfare criterion might prefer the first-sale
regime to the price discrimination regime.6 4 Preventing price
discrimination for these latter purposes, of course, would have little
to do with competition policy as such, but rather would be rooted in
other values.
Notwithstanding these ambiguities, or perhaps because of them,
I remain skeptical of the view that IP law should inhibit price
discrimination schemes as a matter of course. To be sure, there may
be some cases in which doing so would enhance social welfare. For
example, Michael Meurer argues that ProCD's price discrimination
policy probably was welfare reducing, based on his assessment that
little incentive is necessary to induce production of the type of
database at issue in that case, and that duplicative efforts to
produce similar databases promise little social value in return for
the cost.26 As Meurer concedes, however, there is at present little
empirical analysis supporting or negating either proposition.2 6 6
Advocates of rights in databases clearly disagree with Meurer on the
incentive issue, while others may doubt the ability of courts to
make the correct assessment of costs and benefits without hindsight bias."6 7 A further consideration is that the invalidation of
263. See id. at 362.
264. See id. at 369-70.
265. See Meurer, supra note 231, at 105-08.
266. See id. at 108.
267. Doctrinally, it is also difficult to account for the incentive effect when the issue is, as
in ProCD,one of preemption rather than misuse. See supranote 240. Note also that in ProCD
and other cases involving so-called shrinkwrap licenses, if the license term at issue is
unenforceable as a matter of contract law because it lacks mutual consent, there is nothing
for copyright law to preempt. The Seventh Circuit in ProCD held that the license at issue
there was enforceable as a matter of contract law, see ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,

2006]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

549

contractual restrictions on use or resale may induce producers to
incorporate technological use restrictions into their products.2 6 8 The
substitution of technology for contract enables producers to evade
the legal problems arising from contractual restrictions, unless
courts decide to monitor design choices-a task for which they are
probably not well positioned.26 9 Thus, despite suggestions that
misuse doctrine plays a role in filling gaps left by antitrust, 270 and
despite the fact that IP law in theory could fill a gap by condemning
some inefficient price discrimination-enhancing contracts that would
evade antitrust scrutiny-the preceding analysis leads me to doubt
fare any better than
that misuse, or preemption, would 7often
1
antitrust in performing this function.

1450-54 (7th Cir. 1996), but the opinions of other courts and commentators may differ.
268. See Lichtman, supra note 224, at 634; Meurer, supranote 231, at 107; Robinson, supra
note 15, at 1513.
269. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 1519. Precisely out of concern that courts become
entangled in questions concerning design choices, the theory of predatory innovation-that
is, that innovation may violate the antitrust laws, by raising rivals' costs without providing
a commensurate social benefit-has not won widespread favor, despite its potential theoretic
appeal.
270. See Burk, supra note 85, at 1122; Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving
Common Law Doctrine of CopyrightMisuse: A Unified Theory andIts Application to Software,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 872 (2000).
271. See also Robinson, supra note 15, at 1506-07 (arguing that, in light of the ambiguous
effects of price discrimination, construing the first-sale doctrine as a nonmodifiable rule is
unwarranted). I should qualify the statement in the text above in two particulars, however.
First, restrictions on reverse engineering can themselves be viewed as means for enabling
price discrimination. For example, consider Sega's attempt to prevent Accolade from reverse
engineering the source code for Sega's consoles. Sega sold the consoles, which are useless
without games to play on them, with the expectation that it would profit from the sale of
Sega-authorized video games to be played on the console. Users' willingness to buy multiple
games would be a measure of the intensity of their preference for the Sega system. See
Meurer, supra note 231, at 117-18; O'Rourke, supra note 16, at 516-17. Thus, when measures
to prevent reverse engineering are unenforceable, the Segas of the world may respond by
raising console prices, or by designing consoles to be yet more difficult to reverse engineer.
Both responses potentially have negative welfare consequences. Nevertheless, I continue to
find persuasive the arguments that reverse engineering restrictions in some instances reduce
welfare, even if price discrimination generally should be permitted. Second, perhaps in some
cases adherence to the first-sale doctrine is justified for reasons related to free speech or other
values. See infra note 276.
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4. What Is To Be Done?
The preceding analysis suggests that there may be cases in
which the balance of expected costs and benefits is such that a court
would enhance social welfare by excusing the patent or copyright
defendant from liability, even though the potential anticompetitive
harm would not be cognizable, or would be too speculative, in the
analogous antitrust context. Even so, the analysis sounds a
skeptical note that there are a great many such cases, principally
because courts often cannot be sufficiently confident that the
potential harm from ruling for the defendant will be minimal. A
related question therefore is how extensive a court's scrutiny of the
relative harms should be. The more intensive the factual inquiry,
the more confident one may be of the outcome. On the other hand,
even with a very extensive examination of the facts, it may be
impossible to quantify the relevant harms-particularly the harms
to the IP incentive structure. Ideally, the system would encourage
investment in further development of the facts, up to the point at
which the returns on the investment promise a positive payoff-that
is, up to the point at which one would expect another increment of
investigatory cost to produce a commensurate benefit, in terms of
reducing the risk of false positives or false negatives. But it is
unlikely that courts can make more than a rough guess of the
potential benefits from further investigation. Clearly, if it would cost
some nominal amount to reduce the variance of the expected
cost/benefit tradeoff to zero, it would be worth doing so. Beyond this
truism, however, lurks the unhappy reality that the variance is
likely to be unknown and unknowable, as is the effect of spending
another increment of cost in reducing it. A few observations
nevertheless may be relevant.
The first is that the resolution of many of the preceding questions
may depend upon which party has the burden of proof. Under
current law, misuse, fair use, and merger are usually viewed as
affirmative defenses.27 2 Given this starting point, in an ambiguous
case-that is, one in which the magnitude of the relevant harms,
including the harm to the incentive structure, is an open ques272. See, e.g., supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (discussing when fair use might
excuse a defendant from infringing).
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tion-the IP plaintiff should prevail. To be sure, this proposal
merely begs the question of where the burden of proof should lie.
Allocating the burden to the IP defendant, as under current law, is
consistent with the assumption that H2 is, in general, high.
Allocating the burden to the IP plaintiff to disprove misuse or fair
use, on the other hand, would raise the cost of enforcing IP rights
and thus reduce the value of those rights; at the same time, it would
reduce the incidence of false negatives and increase the incidence of
false positives. In part, the resolution of this dilemma must depend
on how important one views the incentive structure to be.27 3
Second, there may be several situations in which it clearly does
not make sense to invest heavily in additional investigation of the
pro- or anticompetitive effects of excusing the IP defendant from
liability. One would be a case in which the stakes are simply too low
to justify the additional cost. For example, suppose that preliminary
evidence suggests that E(H) is $10,000, E(H 2) is $5,000, and that
the expected cost of an additional increment of litigation relating to
proof of market harm is $50,000. Even if these litigation costs could
reduce uncertainty to zero, it seems unlikely that the additional cost
is worthwhile." 4 In this type of case, if the court is sufficiently
confident that E(H) is greater than E(H), without further investigation, it should excuse the IP defendant from liability; if not, and
if the burden of proof rests on the defendant, the court should rule
for the IP plaintiff.
Another type of case in which further investigation of market
harms may not be justified is one in which the court can be
sufficiently confident, without further evidence, that E(H) is close
to zero and E(H) is greater than zero. In such a case, even if there
is considerable variance in the estimate of E(H), the cost of
273. Alternatively, policymakers could explore burden-shifting mechanisms as a means
for better vindicating noneconomic interests such as free speech. A few scholars have
recommended such an approach in some limited fair use contexts. See, e.g., Kenneth D.
Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 68(1999) (arguing that the burden should shift to the plaintiffif the defendant
shows "that the work is unpublished and a lack of known direct evidence of plaintiffs intent
to publish the work or to actively stop its publication"). I plan to take this matter up in greater
depth in a separate paper.
274. If the cost of additional litigation is not discontinuous, as in this example, some
additional cost may be justified, though as noted above it may be impossible to estimate with
any accuracy just how much.
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reducing that variance will not produce any social benefit. Courts
should not boldly assume that these cases are common, however: to
do so invites judges to substitute their intuition for the judgment of
Congress that IP rights encourage a variety of social goods. That
said, there are, as noted above, nonetheless several plausible
instances in which economic theory suggests that the effect upon
incentives of excusing the IP defendant from liability should be
minimal. When that is clearly the case, social welfare will increase
even if the H harm to be avoided is somewhat speculative. Sega and
Lotus v. Borland,conceivably, are two such cases.2 75 Even in cases
such as these, however, unless the stakes are sufficiently low it may
be unwise to preclude the parties from offering evidence relevant to
the plaintiffs market dominance, the existence of network effects,
and other evidence bearing on the magnitude of the expected harms.
Courts should not short-circuit the inquiry by taking judicial notice
that there is no likely impact upon incentives, if in fact evidence
might reasonably cast doubt on this intuition. On the other hand,
elaborate analysis of market definition may not always be the
appropriate focal point. In an appropriate case, analysis may
properly center on the incentive question directly, such as whether
there are sufficient noncopyright incentives in place to induce
production of similar works, and whether there are adequate
alternative means of accessing the work without copying.27 6
In most other instances, however, that raise difficult questions of
misuse or fair use-particularly cases involving restrictions on
reverse engineering or price discrimination--courts probably should
require some proof of anticompetitive effects before excusing the IP
defendant from liability. To be sure, this will raise the cost of
litigating such cases, but the only way to seriously engage the issue
of whether there is a plausible procompetitive rationale for excusing
the IP defendant from liability is by predicting the market conse275. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
276. Yet another case in which elaborate investigation of market harms would be
unjustified would be one in which the restriction at issue is deemed problematic for noncompetition policy-related reasons, such as free speech. See supra note 219. Just because H
may comprise a substantial free-speech component, however, does not necessarily mean that
the resolution of the matter will be easy. If the dynamic efficiency component of H2 is also
large, for example, a ruling for the IP defendant might actually decrease the quantity of
speech in the long run. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
555-60 (1985). There may be no satisfactory way of resolving the tradeoff in such a case.
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quences using the available tools of economics. Even so, it is
conceivable that some sort of sliding scale might be appropriate. A
relatively small prospect of H 2 harm might enable courts to be more
aggressive in permitting unauthorized uses so as to minimize
harm to submarkets, aggregate markets, or innovation markets.
Resorting to a full-blown antitrust inquiry may be unnecessary in
some cases, but the case law should be allowed to develop with the
understanding that the cost of forgoing such an inquiry may be a
greater incidence of false positives.
B. Functionality
In contrast to much of the preceding analysis, comparison of the
costs and benefits relevant to trademark law's functionality doctrine
is relatively straightforward. First, there are many reasons to think
that, in the context of product design trade dress specifically, E(H 2)
is often small. As noted, the rationale for protecting trademarks of
any kind is that consumers use trademarks as source identifiers,
and thus are likely to be harmed by the unauthorized, confusing use
of similar marks;2 v thus, in the absence of trademark protection,
firms would have little incentive to invest in maintaining quality
control.27 As applied to product design trade dress, however, these
rationales are relatively weak. For one thing, the standard of
liability for infringement of any type is likelihood of confusion, not
actual confusion; and for a use to infringe, it need only be likely to
confuse a "substantial portion," not a majority, of the relevant class
of consumers.27 ' Survey evidence purporting to show that a
substantial minority of that class is likely to be confused is often
sufficient to prove liability.Y Furthermore, trademark owners are
not required to show that the confusion is material to consumers'
purchasing decisions. 1 To be sure, all of these features of trademark law apply to conventional trademarks as well, and for good
reason. A standard that imposed liability only when the trademark
277. See supra note 138.
278. See supranote 138.
279. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. g (1995).
280. See id.; see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 163, § 23:1.
281. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 482-83 (1999);
see also Bone, supra note 7, at 2147-48 (noting that trademark doctrine does not take into
consideration the magnitude of the harm resulting from confusion).
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owner proved actual harm to consumers would dramatically
increase the cost of trademark enforcement; at the same time, in
most instances it probably would confer little benefit, because
potential defendants typically have a large number of noninfringing
conventional marks (for example, words) from which to choose.
Thus, as Bone notes, even if the liability standard is overinclusive
in the sense of condemning more conduct than would an actualharm standard, the social cost of overinclusiveness may be minimal,
282
and the benefits substantial in terms of low enforcement costs.
With respect to product design trade dress, however, the liability
standard is even more overinclusive because consumers frequently
encounter trade dress in conjunction with other source identifiers
such as word marks. The potential for harmful confusion is
therefore reduced, even though it may not be eliminated. 28 3 Finally,
producers of goods bearing word marks and having a distinctive
trade dress would still have a robust incentive to invest in quality
control, if other firms could copy their trade dress but not their word
marks. Purchasers would still encounter the word marks and could
be expected to rely upon them in making future purchasing
decisions.2 On balance, the potential cost of false positives in
product design trade dress cases may be relatively low.
On the other hand, in the typical case H may not be very high
either. Unless the exercise of exclusive rights to a particular product
design enables the rights owner to exercise power over a distinct
market, the deadweight loss from protection will be small. Nevertheless, even harm to a "submarket" may be worth vindicating, if
the countervailing benefit to consumers and producers is even
smaller. And in the aggregate, the H, harm may not be so small
after all. If the relevant market can accommodate only a small
number of variations on a particular design, allowing a correspondingly small number of firms to appropriate them may create a
282. See Bone, supra note 7, at 2136.
283. Of course, some consumers may ignore the word marks, or they may encounter
products in post-sale contexts in which other source identifiers are absent. But there is
clearly less potential for harmful confusion than in a case involving a deceptively similar word
affixed to similar goods. Disclaimers too could reduce, even if they did not eliminate, some
residual confusion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 cmt. d (1995)

(discussing disclaimers).
284. See Bone, supra note 7, at 2146-47. But see id. at 2172 (stating that the risk of postsale
confusion may affect some firms' decisions to invest in goodwill).
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meaningful barrier to entry. Even the possibility of being sued for
trade dress infringement may create some deterrent to entry, as the
Supreme Court suggested in Wal-Mart."5 Finally, there is some risk
that, if courts are unwilling to require proof of market definition,
they will rely on intuition to define product markets more broadly
than necessary, thus allowing trade dress owners to assert exclusive
rights over products that do inhabit discrete markets. 8 In such
cases, the deadweight loss may be substantial.2 87 Once again,
though, one can only speculate about the magnitude of H in the
absence of market evidence.
The other factor to take into account, however, is the cost of
defining the market. If this cost outweighs the benefits of greater
certainty, the better choice is not to incur the cost. The preceding
analysis suggests that the stakes of the typical product design trade
dress case are not sufficient to justify the cost of turning every such
case into a miniature antitrust dispute; but if so, then what should
the default rule be? Even if courts are reluctant to inject the expense
of formal market definition into trademark litigation, they could
still require relatively strict evidence of whether the plaintiffs trade
dress inhabits a discrete market-for example, evidence that few
alternative product designs exist-before concluding that the trade
dress is functional.2" Or they could require relatively little
proof-for example, evidence that the design feature at issue is
necessary to the use of the plaintiffs product, without inquiry into
whether adequate market substitutes for that product exist-on the
theory that it is better to err on the side of access. To complicate
matters further, might there be some cases in which the stakes are
sufficiently weighty to merit inquiry into market harm, A la
antitrust? If so, should courts decline to consider such evidence
nonetheless, on the theory that it would open the door to similar
evidence in other cases in which the plaintiff might use the threat
of substantial litigation costs to keep potential defendants at bay?

285. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000).
286. See Bone, supra note 7, at 2176-77.
287. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
288. Logically, however, this choice would still require some grounds for determining
whether another design is a feasible alternative, and thus would avoid an analysis of market
harm only by ignoring the question.
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Rightly or wrongly, post-Traffix courts are directed to classify
product design as functional on the basis of relatively scant evidence
of market harm. This standard makes sense if one can be reasonably confident that E(H) exceeds E(H) in most cases, and the social
cost of obtaining greater certainty outweighs the social benefit of
dispelling this presumption in the occasional case. If the above
analysis of E(H) and E(H) is correct, these conditions may well be
present in the vast majority of product design cases: E(H) may be
close to zero, E(H) somewhat larger even though speculative, and
the cost of greater certainty unjustified in light of the small
aggregate harm resulting from the occasional false positive. A
logically compelling further step would be to urge courts to apply
narrow product definitions in cases involving questions of aesthetic
functionality. For that matter, Bone's surmise that the costs of
protecting product design trade dress under any circumstances
outweigh the minimal benefits may well be correct, though as he
recognizes, the matter cannot be conclusively proven absent the
elusive empirical evidence. 8 9 If the above analysis is correct that H 2
is often close to zero, however, trade dress protection arguably
imposes more costs than benefits across the board, and social
welfare would be greater if protection were eliminated altogether.
CONCLUSION

Courts sometimes invoke a variety of IP doctrines for the express
purpose of promoting competition, but without the careful analysis
of anticompetitive consequences that is often a hallmark of antitrust
litigation. Nonetheless, I have argued that IP's more flexible
approach can make sense in some limited contexts, because IP law
can and should take into account a variety of harms that would be
entitled to little weight in an antitrust context. More specifically,
the expected harm, including error costs, of ruling for the IP
289. As noted above, Bone surmises that courts often intuitively adopt broader product
definitions than the economic evidence, if it were to be conducted, would suggest, thus in
effect permitting trade dress owners to exert exclusive rights over products that inhabit
discrete markets. See id. at 2146-47. Unless one actually produces the economic evidence,
however, the surmise that the social costs of trade dress protection outweigh the social
benefits remains just that-a surmise-as Bone recognizes. See id. at 2183-85. In any event,
by allocating the burden of proving nonfunctionality to plaintiffs, the law takes a tentative
step in favor of resolving ambiguous cases in favor of IP defendants.
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defendant will sometimes be sufficiently low as to counsel in favor
of excusing the defendant from liability, even though the potential
anticompetitive harm resulting from a ruling for the plaintiff would
be unduly speculative or not cognizable at all from the perspective
of antitrust. These considerations also necessarily affect the
analysis of how much courts and litigants should invest in reducing
the variance of expected outcomes. Again, in some IP contexts it
may not be wise to invest more heavily in obtaining information
about the anticompetitive effects of the exercise of IP rights, either
because the stakes are too low or because such information would
be of limited value to estimating the magnitude of the harm at
issue.
Nothing in this analysis, however, suggests that courts should
decide cases by indiscriminately imposing their own intuitions
concerning the optimal scope of IP rights. In the patent context in
particular, courts should be reluctant to take upon themselves the
duty of promoting competition by applying a greatly expanded
misuse doctrine. With respect to copyrights, however, the balancing
of interests permitted by the fair use and merger doctrines may
counsel in favor of a more aggressive procompetitive stance, in some
cases, than would be advisable in an antitrust context. Similarly,
trademark law's functionality doctrine probably serves a useful
social function insofar as it weakens protection for product design
trade dress, because even a weak potential for causing anticompetitive harm most likely outweighs the social benefit of
reducing marginal consumer confusion. Further research may shed
light on the question of whether antitrust law itself should consider
the unique costs and benefits of IP rights, for example in evaluating
unilateral refusals to license IP rights. Developing workable
standards for evaluating such claims may not be easy, but if
analysts focus on the real interests at stake such efforts over time
may bear fruit.

